Commitment and incentives: Economic behaviors under oath.

Authors Publication date
2015
Publication type
Journal Article
Summary Driven, in particular, by the rise of experimental economics, the recent literature has highlighted a wide range of situations in which monetary incentives fail to steer behavior in the desired direction. This observation leads to a search for alternative institutional mechanisms that can replace monetary incentives. This article reviews the work inspired by the social psychology of commitment in order to develop non-monetary mechanisms that can affect behavior. This work studies a particular commitment procedure: a truth-telling oath. This procedure has been successfully applied to 1/ the problem of hypothetical bias in the revelation of preferences for non-market goods, 2/ coordination failures, and 3/ the propensity to tell the truth. Taken together, this work confirms the ability of commitment mechanisms to guide the design of non-monetary institutions capable of effectively guiding economic behavior.
Publisher
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
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