Was the reform of the special pension schemes a "failure"?

Summary We propose a quantitative analysis of the reform of the ratp special pension scheme, negotiated in 2007 and implemented by a decree in January 2008. We focus more specifically on the case of subway drivers. To evaluate the reform, we use the criterion of the real net actuarial cost of an agent per year of service. This cost is based on the calculation of the discounted sum of the real net salaries and pensions earned by a ratp employee during his or her life cycle, to take into account the social cost of retirement. The provisions of the reform, in a permanent regime, should make it possible to save public funds, but the introduction of this new regime is preceded by a long transitional period which will lead to an increase in costs and therefore, presumably, to some increase in public subsidies to the ratp regime. This transitional regime is not negligible, since it concerns all employees recruited before the reform. it preserves certain acquired advantages and offers compensation to employees. The reform is ultimately a transaction between the public authorities and the insiders, to the detriment of future employees. We maintain that a reform that protects the community from an increase in social costs would have been possible and acceptable.