A Rejoinder by the Author.

Summary First lines: In order to respond to the insightful and detailed discussion, I find it helpful to group the authors according to the most relevant issues they have identified. First, I will return to the notion of power in business-government relations, which Wilmarth and Barnes discuss at length and which Reinke finds problematic. Second, I will clarify the use of the game-theoretical framing, which has certain heuristic limitations. It does, however, address the governments’ strategy, contrary to the criticism of Reinke and Jensen. Third, I dive into the empirical study to address other factors that help to explain bailout arrangements. I show why I disagree firmly with Jensen, who believes that healthy banks alone are sufficient to analyze the six cases, suggesting that my argument is over-determined. I do concede, however, that additional elements help to provide a richer analysis, in particular the institutional and legal settings highlighted by Moutot and Thiemann.