Game and contract theory.

Summary This manual studies the strategic behavior of economic agents (consumers, firms, public or private institutions). The first part presents the tools of game theory that allow the analysis of non-contractualized strategic interactions. This is the case of situations where actors do not commit themselves in advance to their strategic behavior, such as in a market where firms are in competition (price, quantity, quality, innovation, investment). In order to cover a broad spectrum, the manual presents the four main configurations of non-cooperative strategic games studied in microeconomics: simultaneous, sequential, repeated and Bayesian. The second part presents the tools of contract theory that allow the analysis of interactions where actors commit to their strategic behavior by means of a contract. Particular attention is paid to situations of asymmetric information, such as those observed in the insurance market or the labor market. The textbook presents the two main types of information asymmetry studied in microeconomics: adverse selection and moral hazard. The particularity of this book is that it approaches these topics with more emphasis on economic reasoning than on mathematical analysis. It facilitates learning and revision through numerous applications and summary problems. Additional digital resources are also provided for teachers.