Debiasing preferences over redistribution: An experiment.
Authors
Publication date
- ESPINOSA Romain
- DEFFAINS Bruno
- THONI Christian
2020
Publication type
Journal Article
Summary
We study the manipulation of preferences over redistribution. Previous work showed that preferences over redistribution are malleable by the experience of success or failure in a preceding real-effort task. We manipulate the information subjects receive about the importance of chance relative to effort in determining success. We investigate the effect of this manipulation on (i) subjects' redistribution choices affecting third parties, and (ii) preferences for redistributive taxation. Our results show that informing the subjects about the relative importance of chance after the real-effort task does not mitigate the self-serving bias in redistribution choices. Only providing full information before the real-effort task prevents the emergence of the self-serving bias.
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Themes detected by scanR from retrieved publications. For more information, see https://scanr.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr