Long Information Design.

Summary We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and asingle agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public informationabout persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal furtherinformation. We consider environments with general constraints on feasible information disclosurepolicies. Our main results characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies of this long informationdesign game and compare them with the equilibrium outcomes of gameswhere designers move onlyat a single predetermined period. When information disclosure policiesare unconstrained, we showthat at equilibrium in the long game, information is revealed right away ina single period. otherwise,the number of periods in which information is disclosed might be unbounded. As an application, westudy a competition in product demonstration and show that more information is revealed if eachdesigner could disclose information at a predetermined period. The format that provides the buyerwith most information is the sequential game where the last mover is the ex-ante favorite seller.