Economic analysis of the producer's civil liability in case of accidents caused by his product.

Summary This study is an economic analysis of producer liability rules as an instrument for preventing product-related accidents. Once it is accepted that legal rules influence the behaviour of individuals, it is interesting to highlight these effects using the instruments proposed by economic theory. After a brief discussion of the foundations of the economic analysis of law, the desirability of different forms of producer responsibility is first studied in the context of a simple model involving a producer and a consumer. Then, the model is progressively extended to take into account the possible existence of price maker firms, imperfect information or products with different levels of reliability. In the second part, the discussion focuses on the economic consequences of the recent evolution of producer liability rules in American, European and French law. These various regulations tend, to varying degrees, to favor a form of no-fault liability. However, this evolution does not always seem to be in conformity with the lessons of the economic analysis of the law, in particular in the case of fault on the part of the victim or of development risks. Correctly applied, a fault-based liability rule can minimize the total cost of accidents.