Coordination, incentives and organizational models: the management of banking IT.

Summary The interdependencies between coordination and incentive mechanisms within organizations are still insufficiently explicit. The purpose of this paper is to make progress on this point by combining two approaches: the first, which comes from industrial production management, bases the coordination of the organization's activities on the modeling of the technical flows that cross it. The second is based on a general principle of duality between operations management and human resources management, with the decentralization of the one going hand in hand with the centralization of the other, and vice versa. In the case of information technology, it appears that human resources are at the heart of the technical model, which poses an original and particularly interesting problem. The dynamics of coordination and incentives that are articulated around this reality are explored. Two typical models, built from an international comparative study on banking informatics, allow us to understand the theoretical modalities that this articulation can take. Beyond the elaboration of these models, the thesis illustrates the role of the theoretical construction in a concrete intervention intended to improve the management of banking IT within an organization. An example of an intervention on a transversal coordination problem during which an original steering mode was developed is discussed in detail.