Public Environmental Policy and Economic Efficiency: Tradable Permits or Regulatory Instruments for Air Pollution Control: A U.S./France Comparative Approach

Summary The thesis originates in the paradox of the low use of economic instruments, even though they are theoretically, and to a lesser extent empirically, deemed to be efficient, the market has imposed itself as the central referent of modern economies, and economic efficiency is now an unavoidable criterion of justification. Two responses are discussed: either the theoretical analysis does not allow for an account of the economic efficiency of a policy instrument, or public environmental policies are not primarily oriented by the search for economic efficiency. The analysis is situated in a framework of limited rationality and intertemporal coherence of public policies. The objective is to identify the place of economic efficiency in the processes of adoption, elaboration and evolution of a public environmental policy from an analytical and not a normative angle. The institutional analysis of American and French pollution control policies, which are respectively representative of the use of a system of tradable permits or a regulatory instrument, shows that the characterization of an instrument only makes it possible to identify original forms of organization, but not the nature of a true coordination. An institutional trajectory is the reinterpretation of policy instruments based on five fundamental elements: the basis of the legitimacy of actors . the regulator's hypothesis on the nature of information . the basis of decision-making . the nature of collective action . the rationality of collective action. A mode of coordination evolves when an event modifies one of the elements and disorganizes the balance of satisfaction of the actors. Economic efficiency becomes an issue for negotiation. An instrument is chosen according to its capacity to resolve a dysfunction without causing a major disruption in coordination.