A study of the financial structure of firms based on moral hazard problems: thesis for the doctorate in Management Sciences.

Summary This thesis proposes a theoretical study of the optimal financial structure of firms, in the framework of principal-agent models with moral hazard. In this sense, it is part of the recent theoretical developments in agency theory. The first chapter presents a review of the literature explaining the choice of a financial structure by moral hazard problems (green (1984), innes (1990), gale and hellwig (1985), bolton and sharfstein (1990). . ). These theoretical results are contrasted with empirical observations (Bradley, Jarell, and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), and Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995)). . ). This highlights the relevance of the models cited, as well as their shortcomings, especially when it comes to explaining the emergence of a mixed financial structure. The second and third chapters offer personal contributions to these issues. The second chapter is a re-reading of the theory of jensen and meckling (1976) in a framework of optimal contracts. The moral hazard problems considered arise from the fact that a manager can choose both a certain level of effort and a certain level of risk when he decides to commit to a project. We show that when the risk choice problem is dominant, the joint issuance of debt and equity is an optimal capital structure. On the other hand, when the effort choice problem is dominant, it is necessary to add to this structure stock options, allocated to the manager, in order to preserve his incentives to effort. The third chapter deals with the financing of start-ups, and the dual role played by financial partners such as business angels. The latter bring to the companies their experience of business management, as well as their financial means. Their intervention is modeled in a context of double moral hazard, where managers and financiers must both make an effort to improve the profitability of the project. We show how the issuance of preferred shares or convertible bonds is an optimal response to the incentive problems posed. These results are supported by empirical evidence.