Public health insurance and health policy.

Summary In this thesis, some issues related to public health insurance and health policy are discussed from a theoretical perspective. The first chapter compares two different methods of paying the insured: reimbursement in kind and reimbursement on treatment costs. In the model, an adverse selection parameter characterizes consumers: individuals have a low or high propensity for medical care. Therefore, the insurance company has the choice between implementing a pooling contract and a self-selecting contract. The results show that, when the benefits are pooling, the reimbursement on treatment costs dominates the reimbursement in kind. In contrast, when benefits are self-selecting, the two types of reimbursement are equivalent from a welfare perspective. The second chapter analyzes secondary prevention as a "self-insurance" instrument. The optimal linear reimbursement for prevention and treatment is determined. The two cases of substitute and complementary goods are analyzed. The results show that treatment consumption should always be encouraged. If treatment and prevention are substitutes, the consumption of prevention should be encouraged, and, on the contrary, if the two goods are complementary, it should be discouraged. The third chapter deals with the problem of the credibility of public authorities when certain health policies are exercised. The government uses taxation and information campaigns with the dual objective of internalizing a negative externality to consumption and informing individuals about the side effects of that consumption. Technically, this amounts to analyzing a signal model with "cheap talk". The results show that the equilibrium game cannot be efficient because the government always wants to manipulate the information.