Three essays in financial contract theory.

Summary This thesis is part of the framework of corporate finance, characterized by the use of tools from game theory and information economics to analyze the financial choices of firms. The first three chapters deal with the interaction between firms' financial choices and their behavior on the goods market. The first chapter provides a review of the literature on this topic. The second chapter explores the possibility that financial contracts may pursue anti-competitive objectives. By purchasing sufficiently risky financial rights, an investor can commit to an entrepreneur not to finance other similar projects. Thus, when financial markets are imperfectly competitive, bank ownership can promote industrial concentration. The third chapter studies the impact of resource reallocation in conglomerates on the competitive behavior of its subsidiaries. The optimal reallocation of resources is such that units that face stiffer competition are subsidized. This implies that internal capital markets provide competitive advantages and costs. The fourth chapter analyzes the financial contracts signed by start-ups with venture capitalists. In an optimal contract framework, we derive the allocation of final revenue and control rights in the venture capital contract. In the optimal contract, we find a negative correlation between the investor's risk and control rights. This result is supported by recent empirical studies of venture capital.