Passive spending activation and labor market performance.

Summary In this thesis, we examine the main reforms undertaken during the 1990s in order to improve the economic efficiency of unemployment benefit systems. Thus, first, the effects of a reduction in the general level of unemployment compensation are analyzed by taking into account the savings behavior of workers. An analysis of the consequences in terms of dynamic adjustment then made it possible to reject the results of the literature, according to which it would be desirable, in order to improve social welfare, to reduce the level of unemployment compensation. An instrument widely used in all OECD countries, eligibility requirements, was also carefully analyzed. The aim was to clarify the impact of changes in the duration of unemployment benefits, as well as in the qualifying period for benefits. These eligibility conditions introduce a certain heterogeneity among the unemployed, whose behavior will depend on their status with respect to the benefit system. The effects of a change in eligibility criteria on unemployment therefore appear indeterminate and weak. However, in terms of welfare, the public decision-maker may have to make choices according to his social objectives: to favour aggregate social welfare or to favour the fate of the most disadvantaged individuals on the labour market. Finally, the third theme addressed in the thesis is the conversion of unemployment benefits into subsidies for firms. This measure, which seems to be favorable to the hiring of the most disadvantaged unemployed in the labor market, such as the long-term unemployed, may have its effectiveness reduced if wages increase with the subsidy to employers.