Rationalization and experimental contracting in a double-bid situation.

Summary In the double submission paradigm, the subject performs two behaviors. To obtain these two behaviours, the experimenter can formulate either two distinct requests, one concerning each behaviour taken in isolation (double contract), or a request concerning both behaviours globally (global contract). The aim was to study the rationalization effects induced by these two types of contract. The results are globally in line with our expectations. When subjects perform two problematic behaviors (case 1) in different commitment contexts, more rationalization is obtained by formulating a global contract than by formulating a double contract (experiment 1). The opposite result is obtained when the two behaviors are performed in identical commitment contexts (Experiment 5). When subjects perform a counter-attitudinal behavior followed by a pro-attitudinal behavior (case 2), less rationalization is obtained by formulating a global contract than by formulating a double contract (experiment 2). We were able to show that these effects were based on the number of decisions made by the subject when the behaviors are consistent with each other (experiments 3 and 5), and on the exhaustive or incomplete information available to the subject before performing the behaviors when they are inconsistent with each other (experiment 4). The results obtained in our five experiments are compatible with the radical theory of dissonance (Beauvois and Joule, 1996). They are, however, difficult to reinterpret within the framework of self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) or impression management theory (Tedeschi, 1981).