The marketing of "en primeur" wines.

Summary This thesis proposes an analysis of the marketing of en primeur wines. Chapter 1 presents the characteristics of this sale as well as a review of the literature analyzing the role of certain financial markets. Chapter 2 provides a justification for the enthusiasm of buyers for the Bordeaux wine market between 1995 and 1999. We show that an investment in wine futures provided significantly better returns than an investment in the stock market. On the other hand, outside the wine market, a portfolio containing wine and financial assets rarely outperformed a conventional portfolio. Chapter 3 studies the role of en primeur sales in the financing of producers. In a model where asymmetric information between banks and wine producers creates a credit rationing problem, we study the certifying role of these sales. We show that because of the possibility of collusion between producers and traders, this marketing is only used for financing purposes. Nevertheless, it solves the problem of credit rationing. Chapter 4 examines advance purchase offers as a means of hedging against a demand shock. If the producer cannot commit to the future price, he faces an intertemporal credibility problem. We show that this problem is solved by rationing demand in the first period. Only risk-averse producers choose to sell in advance and ration demand.