Risk information in insurance and empirical analysis of its individual perception.

Summary The objective of this thesis is to show the role of information on the individual risk of loss in the context of the insurance market. In Chapter 1, the theories of asymmetric information allow us to understand that the existence of an equilibrium and an optimum in this market depends on the holder of this information: do companies know the risk of potential policyholders better than the latter (Rothschild and Stiglitz hypothesis), or is it the opposite? Then, the type of information comes into play: does it concern the risk ex ante (before the choice of insurance contract, Adverse Selection theory) or ex post (Moral Hazard theory)? In Chapter 2, I have selected empirical studies (econometric and experimental) that are partly concerned with the market as a whole: they test the actual existence of this information asymmetry. Other studies consider only the "demand" side of the market: they examine the factors involved in the decision to insure. In the light of these theoretical and empirical developments, I then focused my research on the individual choice of an insurance contract (Chapter 3): the notion of information on risk is approached from the more precise angle of the individual perception of risk. By analyzing a database of car drivers insured with a French company, my intention is to determine whether individuals are realistic about their accident liability risk. The econometric models considered lead to the conclusion that the risk is overestimated. Furthermore, comparisons on this realism are presented according to the past liability of the insureds, as well as socio-economic criteria. In conclusion, I propose the possible use of my results in reality.