Job search effectiveness and unemployment compensation.

Summary The main objective of unemployment insurance is to provide a decent income in case of job loss. But this very narrow conception of unemployment insurance has perverse effects if it does not allow for assistance and an incentive to search for work, notably because of the problem of moral hazard. The control of this search and the placement of job seekers are two functions inherent to unemployment compensation. They reinforce the missions of the unemployment insurance system by giving priority to the return to employment. This thesis aims to better understand the effects of unemployment compensation on job search efficiency. How do control systems modify the search behavior of the unemployed? How does the organization of job placement affect their job search? Job search control systems accompanied by sanctions modify the optimal unemployment insurance contract: high unemployment benefits, by increasing the penalty an unemployed person faces for not searching, provide an incentive to search. However, we show that excessive or misdirected controlJe can harm the job search of the unemployed and degrade the average quality of jobs. The activity of placing the unemployed is closely linked to unemployment compensation. The presence of many placement operators contributes to a better efficiency of the job search for the unemployed: the costs of the job search are reduced and the return to work rates are higher. Nevertheless, the use of private operators raises problems, particularly with regard to the treatment of low-skilled workers.