Buying power and competition in the retail sector.

Summary This thesis examines the costs and benefits of retailer buying power in the retail industry. Buying power is a source of efficiency when it offers competitive prices and product variety to the consumer, but it can distort competition between suppliers and increase the market power of retailers. In chapter 1, the inflation of national brands that followed the 1996 regulations is explained by the behavior of retailers. Entry into the discount market and the pricing of private labels were not enough to stop this development. Chapter 2 is a case study of French distribution networks, conducted using transaction cost theory. The coexistence of integrated groups and cooperatives of independents is due to different degrees of asset specificity. The strategic price positioning of the independent cooperatives is explained by the governance of the buying groups by means of the third party, which saves transaction costs. A model of enforcement is proposed in chapter 3. The distributor punishes the suppliers for the damages suffered. Deterrence is usually excessive when the distributor uses monetary and/or non-monetary quasi-sanctions. An empirical analysis of private label production in Chapter 4 shows that the retailer chooses domestic producers consistent with its branding strategy. Moreover, retailers prefer domestic producers when their bargaining power is low and SME alternatives are numerous.