Intertemporal choices: a behavioral model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.

Summary This thesis proposes a model of intertemporal choice based on the hypothesis of a rational individual with imperfect knowledge of his temporal preferences. At the moment of choice, the individual seeking cognitive consistency reconciles several successive cognitions: his normative preference represented by the expected utility (DU) model - which he perceives with more or less precision - and one or several myopic preferences dictated by the context of the decision. We first deal with the general case of a myopic preference for the closest reward in time. This preference, generated by a primacy effect in the perception of income or consumption, leads the individual to adopt a quasi-hyperbolic discount in all his intertemporal choices, explaining a large number of anomalies in the DU model. We then discuss the case where one of the choice options gives rise to a "visceral" preference and the case where one option is the status quo, leading to new inconsistencies. We test the general "sequential discounting" model and the status quo model with experimental data. Finally, we apply the modeling to life cycle savings decisions. The individual is assumed to be permanently subject to consumption signals that induce a preference for immediate consumption that he cannot anticipate. In doing so, he constantly experiences excess consumption compared to his plans. We show that the existence of an illiquid asset can allow him to constrain his future consumption and avoid a critical savings shortfall at the time of retirement.