Rationalizability in games and the coordination of expectations.

Summary We study an economic model composed of a continuum of agents and an aggregate state of the world on which agents have negligible influence. We propose a reminder of the links between the approach that emphasizes Strongly Rational Anticipatory Equilibria, and the concepts of rationality. We then explore the scope and limits of these links, both locally and globally, or depending on whether rationality is conventional or ad hoc. In particular, we define and characterize the set of (Punctually-) Rationalizable states. The role of belief heterogeneity in the general context of expectations coordination is explained. While in the case of strategic complementarities, the study of a certain best response operator is essential for the analysis, in the case of unambiguous strategic substitutabilities the study of the second iteration and the second-order cycles allow to describe the set of Rationalizable States.