General practitioners' income: three microeconometric studies.

Summary The first chapter studies the impact of the regulation of medical demography on the careers of general practitioners. We show that the conditions of installation of doctors, which are linked to the numerus clausus, affect their fees in a substantial and lasting way. The analysis in terms of stochastic dominance also shows that the differences linked to individual heterogeneities do not compensate for the considerable differences identified on average for the cohorts. A second chapter focuses on a remarkable phenomenon in the population of general practitioners : the existence of a large minority of doctors with very low incomes. We show that these low incomes result from the greater preference of these physicians for leisure. This very low activity is not a sign of a deterioration in the status of the doctor. It reflects an advantage of the liberal medical profession - doctors can choose to work little. A third chapter evaluates the positioning of general practitioners by comparing their income with that of senior executives. Comparing the career value of physicians and executives provides a measure of the relative advantage of being a physician. The analysis shows that there is a very clear financial advantage to being a general practitioner and that this advantage has increased over time. The existence of an annuity for doctors is the result of the competitive examination for admission to medical school. This rent has evolved positively with the restrictions on the numerus clausus.