Socio-cultural heterogeneity, information asymmetry and firm performance: the case of Côte d'Ivoire.

Summary This thesis proposes an empirical study of the influence of socio-cultural variables on the internal organization of the firm and their consequences on its performance. The focus is on the problems of information asymmetry and collusion. The first chapter summarizes the reference models of incentive theory proposed by Laffont (2000) and Martimort (1999) respectively. These theoretical frameworks allow us to formally and rigorously analyze the problem of information asymmetry in the firm. We are then able to understand how the formation of coalitions between employees can influence the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms, and modify the Principal-Agent relationship. The second chapter allows us to show empirically how the socio-cultural context modifies incentive contracts and how this influence is reflected in the performance of the firm. In the context of industrial firms in Côte d'Ivoire, we show that certain sociocultural variables can modify the transaction costs incurred by employees and managers. The results of our empirical study suggest that, in the firms in our sample, the effectiveness of collusion among subordinates differs according to their degree of socio-cultural affinity. Thus, a culturally homogeneous network of subordinates appears more difficult to supervise than a culturally heterogeneous network of subordinates, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the technology for supervising a culturally homogeneous network of supervisors appears to be more effective than that of a culturally heterogeneous network of supervisors, ceteris paribus. In this case, our results suggest a positive relationship between the supervisory technology of Ivorian coaches and labor productivity.