Strategic behaviors and diversity of players in the venture capital industry.

Summary The objective of this thesis is to study the extent to which the ownership structure of venture capital (VC) firms influences the supply and quality of financing for innovative project holders. In particular, this research aims to understand the relative merits of financing by independent VC firms and those affiliated with a banking network. Affiliated firms make optimal decisions regarding the continuation of funded projects. This is not the case for independent firms, but they provide better assistance to the entrepreneur, which is crucial for the success of innovative projects. These results provide a new explanation for the debate on international differences in the dynamism of VC markets. Empirical tests partially validate the predictions of the theoretical model. The first chapter is devoted to a review of the literature on the structure of VC firms. The second chapter proposes a theoretical model to compare the advantages of independent VC firms and those affiliated with banking networks for an entrepreneur with an innovative project. The third chapter deepens this analysis by introducing the possibility of entrusting the entrepreneur with the decision-making power on the continuation of the projects. In the fourth chapter, we apply the model to VC firms wishing to withdraw precipitously from financed projects to benefit from other opportunities. Finally, in the fifth chapter, we empirically test the model's predictions on a sample of investments from two French VC firms, one independent and the other affiliated with a banking network.