Essays on banking regulation reforms: some lessons from the financial crisis.

Summary To limit the systemic potential of future financial crises, it is necessary to strengthen the macro-prudential dimension of regulation. In this thesis, we propose the following four avenues for the construction of a more robust macro-prudential framework: i) detect decisions that play a decisive role on the level of risk of the bank and its exposure to financial crises. ii) use an aggregate leverage indicator to detect runaway credit supply. iii) introduce a form of Prompt Corrective Action in Europe whose detection signals would be composed of information on the capital and liquidity of banks. iiii) find the best way to fight against the moral hazard risk of systemic financial institutions. The results of this work are as follows: 1) the combination of an aggressive leverage policy and a financing policy largely oriented towards short-term markets is the determining factor in identifying vulnerable banks. 2) The aggregate leverage indicator we constructed has a fairly high predictive power and can therefore be used as a tool for detecting financial crises. 3) Information on liquidity risk seems to be a good complement to capital ratios to detect vulnerable banks and trigger supervisory intervention in the framework of a European Prompt Corrective Action. 4) the most relevant solutions to solve the moral hazard problem associated with systemic institutions seem to be those that aim at simplifying the structure of banks in order to facilitate their resolution.