Economic analysis of the means and organization of justice.

Summary The means and organization of justice are important determinants of the efficiency of this institution. However, these aspects are still marginally studied in the economic analysis of law. After having highlighted the need for a framework for the economic analysis of the relations between the results of judicial activity, the means allocated to the system, the demand for justice and its modes of organization, we contribute directly to the exploration of these relations. First, thanks to a theoretical model, we demonstrate the existence of a multiplier effect of public spending on justice based on the analysis of a particular type of conflict: rental disputes. We then show that a marginal increase in spending on the resolution of this type of conflict significantly improves both the functioning of the courts and the functioning of the rental housing market. Then, thanks to an econometric test using original data - in particular those produced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice - we highlight a positive and robust link between individuals' confidence in justice and various budgetary variables. We develop the idea that the justice budget plays a role as a signal of the quality of the institution for agents whose real knowledge of the judicial system is limited. Finally, in a double moral hazard model applied to the production of justice, we analyze the relationships between the means and the organization of justice and between the latter and the results of its activity. We then show that certain equilibria in the strategic game between the agents responsible for the production of judicial services - the government and the judiciary - correspond to inefficient situations because the judiciary is led to carry out administrative tasks in place of the government, at the cost of a relatively low level of production of judicial services.