Economic environment and elections: a study of the determinants of voting applied to French municipal elections.

Summary This thesis seeks to determine the economic and political factors that influence voting in French municipal elections. It seeks to test the hypotheses underlying economic voting in French municipal elections, using an original and detailed database covering the period 1983-2008. We show that the incumbent party is punished if the macroeconomic situation is bad. Conversely, the incumbent party is a victim of the national political climate, especially in periods of cohabitation. Moreover, local environmental variables also influence the incumbent's score in the 2001 election. This thesis also concludes that electoral behavior is complex, with varying degrees of sociotropism revealed: for fiscal variables, the local level is taken into account by voters, while the national level is of interest for macroeconomic variables (unemployment). Finally, the two-round voting system is not insignificant in determining the municipal vote. Thus, the structure of local budgets is a determining factor in the first round. More specifically, high per capita spending on salaries and equipment increases the probability that the incumbent party will be re-elected in the first round, while operating expenditures (excluding salaries) reduce it. Conversely, certain political factors (e.g., the number of candidates running) only come into play in the second round.