The principle of efficiency in European jurisprudence.

Summary For too long, the analysis of the European Union's jurisprudence has been the sole focus of legal scholars. But, if successive jurisprudential analyses have so far apprehended the structuring principles of this jurisprudence and have attempted to conceptualize them, it will be argued that these undertakings have been only partial. Indeed, the main principle, albeit implicit, of the evolution of the European Union's jurisprudence is the principle of economic efficiency. This deficiency, which renders the conceptualization of European jurisprudence only imperfect, is due to the absence of a methodical and systemic economic analysis of European law and, more particularly, of European jurisprudence. This thesis intends to fill this gap. Beyond undertaking an in-depth economic analysis of European jurisprudence allowing for a renewed and clarified conceptualization of the figure of the European judge, our study will allow us to enter the debate on the alleged superiority of Common Law systems in terms of economic efficiency. Moreover, our thesis, through an original analysis grid renewing the analysis of (European) law, will highlight the points of convergence and divergence between lines of jurisprudence. The systematization of our jurisprudential analysis by the perspective of the principle of economic efficiency will allow us, thus, to elaborate a real scientific hypothesis that can be falsified and falsified. We will formulate a hypothesis of the economic efficiency of European jurisprudence.