Insurance and prevention of work-related risks.

Summary In France, as in several other industrialized countries, the insurance system for occupational injuries and diseases includes an a posteriori pricing mechanism. The aim is to encourage individual companies to invest in the prevention of occupational injuries. Beyond this expected effect, however, this system potentially leads to undesired effects: accentuation of the under-reporting of claims, negative influence on employment and salaries, etc. In addition, the phenomenon of under-recognition of occupational injuries may substantially limit the benefits of this system in terms of prevention. The present research sheds light on the capacity of this system to mitigate the social cost of work-related accidents and diseases. The results suggest in particular that this system leads to an increase in the prevention effort of companies and a decrease in their claims rate. However, they also highlight a massive phenomenon of under-recognition of work-related health expenses among blue-collar and white-collar workers, limiting the scope of this scheme.