New forms of regulation and financial markets. A study of comparative law.

Summary The legal systems of today are quite different from those in force forty years ago. This statement is applicable in particular to the economic fields that are under the empire of what is known as regulation. In fact, a simple look at contemporary law shows, on the one hand, a splintering of new entities whose mission is to create, supervise and even apply the law, and, on the other hand, the existence of adjustments in the conception and application of the norms that govern a certain activity. The development of soft law, self-regulation and international norms, among other examples, are part of the said adjustments. This phenomenon, known as new forms of regulation, which was strongly supported by some legal doctrine a few years ago, is now being questioned. Even if regulation is a universal phenomenon, we have decided to put the financial markets at the center of our analysis. This is because the regulated sectors present a diversity of situations, modalities of action and foundations that prevent an overall analysis. In this sense, it has been said that the legitimacy of regulation and the rules it sets cannot be considered in the abstract. It must be appreciated in the relationship between its norms and the regulated object. In this context, the financial markets are a privileged laboratory for experimenting with new forms of regulation; they are at the origin of their use, and it is precisely in these markets that the questioning of new forms of regulation has arisen. Our study concerns the use of new forms of regulation in the supervision of financial markets in six countries: France, England, the United States and three Latin American countries: Mexico, Colombia and Chile. The reasons for this choice are as follows. First, we believe it is legitimate to discuss the legislation that is at the root of the phenomena analyzed here. The American model is essential, but also the English model, because it was, for a time, the most advanced example of economic liberalism, and therefore of the origins of new forms of regulation. France was also an indispensable reference. In fact, as we want to show, France is the most perfect example of the quest for a culmination of the logic of regulation and of the systematization, even if incomplete, of regulatory law. We chose Mexico because of the size of its financial market, Colombia because it has undertaken remarkable legal reforms, and Chile because it is the most politically and economically stable country in southern Latin America.