Governance at BCEAO and BEAC: monetary experiences in the African franc zone.

Summary If the literature on inflationary bias of the New Classical School, through the concepts of credibility and transparency, led to the independence of central banks, its critique by the New Keynesian School reduced it to an instrumental independence and highlighted the role of its governance, the importance of its relationship with the political sphere for the legitimacy of its action, as well as the essential role of the Monetary Policy Councils (MPC).Both in theory and in practice, this institutional framework that reflects governance shows a Central Bank that is not separate from politics but rather in relationship with it. Insofar as monetary policy decisions are taken by a MPC, governance also concerns its organization and the procedures for making the decision. The objective of this thesis is to analyze, in light of recent developments, governance at the BCEAO and the BEAC, which are the central banks covering the two monetary unions in the franc zone, namely the WAEMU for the former and the CEMAC for the latter. This thesis also aims to show that the sustainability of these two monetary unions depends on better governance and the need for fiscal federalism within them, which implies stronger political union. However, we highlight the obstacles that make it very difficult to achieve this final stage of integration.