Essays on the economic analysis of corporate liability.

Summary The accelerating pace of technological innovation and pressures from civil society are two major challenges for tort law. This thesis studies the incentive effects of civil liability on the prevention behavior of companies in this context. Our contribution aims, in particular, to deepen the traditional analysis of corporate liability on the one hand, and on the other hand to assess to what extent non-statutory sanctions play a role alongside this legal framework. First, we highlight the evolution of the economic analysis of liability. Then we study civil liability in a theoretical model, with the contribution of assessing the incentive effects of the legal concept of causation. Then, we examine how the difficulties in predicting accident risks affect the incentives provided by civil liability, through a theoretical model on the one hand, and through a laboratory experiment on the other. We develop in a theoretical model an analysis of the role of non-legal sanctions, emanating from civil society, alongside tort liability. We show that the incentives provided by consumer boycotts on the prevention behavior of companies are limited. Finally, we complement this model with an empirical study, and investigate the extent and determinants of the consumer boycott phenomenon in Europe.