Housing market regulation and labor market regulation.

Summary The first chapter shows the interdependence in the rental market between procedural formalism (PF) and local social networks. While PF increases the cost of resolving legal disputes between landlords and tenants, social networks have the advantage of being able to resolve a dispute without the courts. PS makes individuals belonging to a social network more attractive to the landlord. The second chapter explains the importance of sunlight on the demand for regulation of the rental market. The sunny countries of southern Europe are attractive because of their mildness of life. This potential immigration increases the tension on the rental market. To reduce this tension, individuals from southern Europe develop a complementarity between local social capital and regulation. This strategy explains a Mediterranean equilibrium where local social capital and PF are high. On the other hand, the lack of attractiveness of countries with little sunshine explains an Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian equilibrium with opposite characteristics. The third chapter explains the support for labor market regulation by the presence of regulations on the rental market. When the latter is highly regulated, landlords select tenants according to their ability to pay the rent. Protecting open-ended contracts forces firms to select workers and then allows landlords to better estimate the individual risk of layoff. We construct a model where unemployed individuals demand more regulations and protections despite the increase in unemployment and the share of temporary contracts.