Essays on the economic analysis of negotiation.

Summary In the context of civil liability actions, the proportion of disputes resolved by amicable agreement between the parties remains very heterogeneous across the different countries. The failure of negotiations between the parties is a source of litigation, the cost of which is high, both for the state and for the parties involved in the litigation. In this thesis, we use a wide range of empirical methods to study the variables that can influence the probability of conciliation between two parties involved in a lawsuit. The work carried out can be divided into four main themes. First, we conduct a meta-analysis to study the rationality of individuals in one of the simplest negotiation games: the ultimatum game. The results of our analysis show that proposers act rationally and correctly anticipate the behavior of the respondents facing them, in order to maximize their profit. Subsequently, we perform a comparative meta-analysis of the ultimatum and dictator games to analyze the fairness assumption that the offers made in these two games are not significantly different. Our study finds a positive correlation between the level of development of countries and the probability of rejection of this hypothesis. In a third step, we focus on the variables that may influence the probability of conciliation between two parties involved in a labour dispute in France. The presence of a lawyer for the plaintiff during the conciliation phase and the size of the amount at stake in the dispute seem to have a negative influence on the probability of conciliation. Finally, we conduct a laboratory experiment to analyze the behavior of individuals who do not wish to negotiate but are nevertheless forced to do so. The results of our experiment show that subjects are more aggressive when they are forced to negotiate. This aggressiveness translates into less generous offers and a higher rejection rate.