Profit-sharing, shareholding and conflicts in the company: studies on French company data.

Summary The basic idea behind incentive contracts is the realization of common interests that lead to changes in employee behavior and improved company performance. The results and success of the company also depend on the climate of industrial relations. In this context, the objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of financial participation (profit-sharing and employee shareholding) and its links with conflicts based on data from French companies. Research on these two themes is of practical and innovative importance. First of all, there are many different types of conflicts within the firm. We are primarily interested in collective conflicts. Second, most studies of collective conflict focus only on strikes, ignoring other forms of collective action, and very few studies make the link to collective incentive systems within the firm. Thus, this work is divided into four empirical studies. The first one aims at analyzing the different forms of conflicts within the firm. The second study analyzes the effect of financial participation on collective conflicts. The third study looks at the impact of negotiation and financial participation on the resolution of collective conflicts. Finally, the last study examines the performance of firms as a function of financial participation and collective conflict. Our research relies on multidimensional and econometric analysis tools. The multidimensional approach uses Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Ascending Hierarchical Classification, while the econometric approach uses classical estimation methods (OLS, Simple Probit, Multinomial Probit, Ordered Probit), selection models (Heckman), and recursive models with simultaneous equations to deal with endogeneity problems and the mixture (quantitative and qualitative) of the dependent variables (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process)