Four essays in urban economics and political economy.

Summary This thesis contributes to the study of interactions between individuals within cities. More concretely, my research focuses on three main themes - (1) residential segregation, (2) local politics, (3) and real estate agent behavior - which are investigated through four empirical studies. The literature on residential segregation analyzes the extent to which multiple population groups are able to interact within a space. Despite the numerous studies on this topic, little is known about the consequences of industrialization on intergroup diversity or isolation (religious or ethnic). The first chapter of this thesis is co-authored with Professor Saleh. We document the consequences of two waves of industrialization on residential segregation between Muslims and non-Muslims in nineteenth-century Cairo. The opening and closing of large state-owned factories allows us to observe the evolution of intergroup segregation in the neighborhoods most impacted by these waves of industrialization. We thus compare the arrival of unskilled workers (mostly Muslim) in these neighborhoods with the evolution of intergroup isolation measured at the local level. In this first project, we show that policies implemented at the city level impact the ability of individuals to interact. Conversely, relationships between individuals can impact policy and decision making at the local level. In the second chapter of this thesis, I show that family networks also play an important role in these elections in cities with more than 3500 inhabitants. More than 40% of the lists in municipal elections include several individuals from the same family. Moreover, voters seem to react to these "family networks". Indeed, lists composed of several individuals from the same family obtain fewer votes than lists where no individual seems to compete with another family member. I then discuss some mechanisms that might explain this result and show that it is not simply a matter of ineffective list leaders using their family networks. It is possible that voters sanction the risk of nepotism. In another chapter (chapter 3), I study the issuance of building permits within cities and show that individuals who supported the municipal majority during the 2008 elections obtain more building permits for new housing than those who supported other lists. I discuss the mechanisms that may generate this result. The incentives of local politicians seem crucial, especially those related to political competition. For example, the difference in obtaining building permits is larger in cities with low political competition. The final chapter of this thesis studies the behavior of real estate agents. Previous studies (Levitt and Syverson (2008) in particular), illustrate the agency problem between real estate agents and sellers. The former want to sell faster (and therefore perhaps cheaper) than the latter. As a result, agents may wish to bias their estimates of property values to convince sellers to lower their prices. In joint work with Professor Cherbonnier, we show that increasing competition can partially solve this problem. Agents value properties at higher levels when they are in competition, which results in higher listing prices and higher sales prices. Conversely, more coordination among real estate agents negatively impacts prices.