Essays in Political Economics : On the Determinants and Patterns of Voter Turnout.

Summary This thesis consists of three chapters in political economy. The central theme linking the chapters is the analysis of voter turnout. The first chapter examines voting participation and candidate strategies in a model of political competition. The etic motivation to participate in voting is related to abstention motivated by indifference or alienation - that of citizens who place themselves at the same distance from all candidates or too far from each one. Contrary to the median voter theorem, candidates move away from the center if citizens are polarized and inclined to alienation. They thus offer extreme policies to mobilize their supporters to participate. At the individual level, the analysis shows how voters may share the costs of voting for their candidate, depending on the intensity of their preference. The comparative statics results are consistent with the empirical evidence on voter turnout and voter/candidate polarization. The second chapter is motivated by evidence of a "bandwagon" effect in the experimental voting games, often due to higher turnout among majority members. This evidence, however, is in contrast to the pivotal voting model, which predicts a higher turnout among the minority group, due to a higher probability of being decisive. The paper resolves this contradiction by showing that a bandwagon effect can be generated by concave utility functions, making voter participation more costly for supporters of the likely loser. The analysis thus establishes the role of risk aversion as a determinant of a bandwagon effect. The third chapter studies a voting model in which voters are interested in the legitimacy of the government formed by the winning group. A measure of "legitimate mandate" is introduced as a function of the margin of victory and total turnout. The main result shows that the relationship between legitimacy and turnout can be reversed in equilibrium: an increase in the size of turnout can thus reduce it while increasing the legitimacy of the mandate. This effect arises from a change in the turnout of competing groups, leading to a higher margin of victory for the majority. The model offers additional justification for a bandwagon effect, due to low turnout by citizens who do not want to contribute to the legitimacy of an opposing government.