LESUEUR Jean Yves

This doctoral thesis focuses on the economics of aging. It examines in greater detail the determinants of individual decisions in terms of retirement, health prevention and the purchase of long-term care insurance. Chapter 1 starts from the observation that financial incentives to encourage individuals to delay their retirement have relatively limited and heterogeneous effects. It explores the role of another potential determinant of the retirement decision: the time inconsistency bias. Using French survey data, the econometric analysis shows that individuals exhibiting time inconsistency are much less likely to delay their retirement in order to benefit from a pension bonus (surcote). Chapter 2 examines the causal effect of retirement on preventive and risky behaviors within couples. This article is the first to take into account coordination between spouses and the effects of asymmetrical externalities of behaviour in this type of evaluation. The econometric results on European survey data reveal heterogeneous effects depending on the behaviors studied, but also on the status of the pre-retirement job and the order of retirement within the couple. Chapter 3 examines the nature of the relationship between prevention effort and the demand for LTC insurance, in the context of the introduction of a prevention program by an insurer. The equilibrium predictions of a theoretical insurance model show that the prevention program does not lead to a reduction in self-protection effort, but does have an ambiguous effect on the choice of insurance coverage rate. The results of the associated econometric analysis on French survey data show a positive effect of the intention to participate in the programme on the prevention effort and on the insurance decision, thus rejecting the existence of an eviction effect. They also indicate the existence of advantageous selection in the French LTC insurance market.

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No summary available.

The aim of the health system reforms implemented in recent years in most countries has been to shift the focus from curative medicine to preventive medicine. In a context of budgetary constraints, these reforms aim in particular to stimulate a market for prevention in order to reduce risks and improve the efficiency of healthcare expenditure. The National Interprofessional Agreement (ANI) implemented since 2016 in France, which requires private sector companies to offer supplementary health insurance to their employees is part of this context. The conditions of this agreement, in fact, provide that part of the contributions be invested by insurance companies and mutual insurance companies in prevention programs ensuring personalized monitoring of the insured in their lifestyle and health. The adherence of policyholders to these services, often free of charge and attached to the complementary health insurance offer, is one of the key factors of the success of this preventive health policy. Based on the results of a survey conducted in 2016 among a sample of policyholders of a French mutual insurance group, we study the determinants of the intentions of the policyholders surveyed to participate in such a service offer. Beyond the socio-demographic determinants regularly highlighted by studies on the demand for prevention, we are more specifically concerned with the effect of behavioral biases on the one hand, and the possible induced effect of medical follow-up on participation in prevention programs on the other. While our econometric results tend to moderate the influence of the role of curative medicine on participation in prevention programs, they do reinforce the very significant influence of behavioral biases.

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No summary available.

No summary available.

Comparative competition between European health systems does not support the French case. For the same or even lower health expenditures, several European partners show better results in terms of disability-free life expectancy at age 65 and in terms of the rate of premature deaths avoidable by primary prevention before age 65. Faced with this paradox, the institutional reforms implemented in recent years have aimed to shift the focus from curative to preventive medicine. In a context of public deficit, the incentives aim to favour the development of a prevention market linked to the complementary health insurance market. With the National Interprofessional Agreement (ANI) put in place since 2016, private sector companies are obliged to offer supplementary health insurance to their employees. By this agreement, collective insurance contracts, but by contamination also individual contracts, are accompanied by an offer, often included and free of charge, of prevention programs ensuring a personalized accompaniment of the insured in their lifestyle and health. This article examines the consequences from the point of view of the insured of adhering to such prevention programs. In particular, we analyze the impact of this free prevention offer on the trade-off between prevention effort and insurance coverage. We show that the management of moral hazard risk is strongly affected in this context compared to the predictions of insurance models in line with the seminal article by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Our results highlight under-insurance in primary prevention and over-insurance in secondary prevention.

This doctoral dissertation examines the major labor market failures that result in workers failing to earn the full potential compensation commensurate with their human capital. Wage inefficiency" occurs when the wage obtained is less than the maximum attainable. In such a case, employees receive a wage that is unfair in relation to the human capital available. This discourages investment in human capital, which tends to reduce total productivity, weaken competitiveness and harm the country's economic growth. The contribution that we make through this work is threefold. First, we propose a new perspective on the integration of young people into the labor market. Rather than examining whether or not individuals obtain a stable employment contract, we adopt an approach that focuses on the quality of the "job-skills" match of young people entering the labor market. Our work provides empirical results that highlight the different theories of job search. Second, because of the considerable challenge of identifying and assessing discriminatory practices in the labor market, we propose an innovative and effective approach to examine the glass ceiling phenomenon (invisible barrier to accessing higher-paying decision-making positions). In the last part of this thesis, we propose a theoretical econometric model that improves the correction of the selection bias problem for stochastic frontier models.

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No summary available.

Comparative competition between European health systems does not support the French case. For the same or even lower health expenditures, several European partners show better results in terms of disability-free life expectancy at age 65 and in terms of the rate of premature deaths avoidable by primary prevention before age 65. Faced with this paradox, the institutional reforms implemented in recent years have aimed to shift the focus from curative to preventive medicine. In a context of public deficit, the incentives aim to favour the development of a prevention market linked to the complementary health insurance market. With the National Interprofessional Agreement (ANI) put in place since 2016, private sector companies are obliged to offer supplementary health insurance to their employees. By this agreement, collective insurance contracts, but by contamination also individual contracts, are accompanied by an offer, often included and free of charge, of prevention programs ensuring a personalized accompaniment of the insured in their lifestyle and health. This article examines the consequences from the point of view of the insured of adhering to such prevention programs. In particular, we analyze the impact of this free prevention offer on the trade-off between prevention effort and insurance coverage. We show that the management of moral hazard risk is strongly affected in this context compared to the predictions of insurance models in line with the seminal article by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Our results highlight under-insurance in primary prevention and over-insurance in secondary prevention.

No summary available.

Comparative competition between European health systems does not support the French case. For the same or even lower health expenditures, several European partners show better results in terms of disability-free life expectancy at age 65 and in terms of the rate of premature deaths avoidable by primary prevention before age 65. Faced with this paradox, the institutional reforms implemented in recent years have aimed to shift the focus from curative to preventive medicine. In a context of public deficit, the incentives aim to favour the development of a prevention market linked to the complementary health insurance market. With the National Interprofessional Agreement (ANI) put in place since 2016, private sector companies are obliged to offer supplementary health insurance to their employees. By this agreement, collective insurance contracts, but by contamination also individual contracts, are accompanied by an offer, often included and free of charge, of prevention programs ensuring a personalized accompaniment of the insured in their lifestyle and health. This article examines the consequences from the point of view of the insured of adhering to such prevention programs. In particular, we analyze the impact of this free prevention offer on the trade-off between prevention effort and insurance coverage. We show that the management of moral hazard risk is strongly affected in this context compared to the predictions of insurance models in line with the seminal article by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Our results highlight under-insurance in primary prevention and over-insurance in secondary prevention.

Comparative competition between European health systems does not support the French case. For the same or even lower health expenditures, several European partners show better results in terms of disability-free life expectancy at age 65 and in terms of the rate of premature deaths avoidable by primary prevention before age 65. Faced with this paradox, the institutional reforms implemented in recent years have aimed to shift the focus from curative to preventive medicine. In a context of public deficit, the incentives aim to favour the development of a prevention market linked to the complementary health insurance market. With the National Interprofessional Agreement (ANI) put in place since 2016, private sector companies are obliged to offer supplementary health insurance to their employees. By this agreement, collective insurance contracts, but by contamination also individual contracts, are accompanied by an offer, often included and free of charge, of prevention programs ensuring a personalized accompaniment of the insured in their lifestyle and health. This article examines the consequences from the point of view of the insured of adhering to such prevention programs. In particular, we analyze the impact of this free prevention offer on the trade-off between prevention effort and insurance coverage. We show that the management of moral hazard risk is strongly affected in this context compared to the predictions of insurance models in line with the seminal article by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Our results highlight under-insurance in primary prevention and over-insurance in secondary prevention.

In the context of a race to hire in the labor market, we measure the influence of the union's bargaining power on the outcome of the competition between two duo-firms. A theoretical model identifies the influence of efficient bargaining on the maximum bid of each firm. The properties of this model are tested by the two-step Heckman procedure. Union power reduces a firm's probability of winning the auction, but only above a certain level.

This doctoral dissertation explores the links between prison, reintegration, and recidivism. Each of the four chapters contributes to the growing field of the economics of crime, applying various econometric methods on French data to answer key questions for public policy.Chapter 1 explores the dynamics of recidivism risk after release from prison. This article is the first to document the shape of the recidivism hazard over time in France (a rapidly decreasing function) and to explore the major individual determinants that explain the level and dynamics of risk over time.Chapter 2 studies the causal effect of sentence reductions on recidivism. This article is the first to explicitly consider the critical role of inmate expectations and adaptation. By exploiting the French collective pardon of July 1996 as a natural experiment, the results support the importance of the concrete design of sentence reductions. Chapter 3 proposes the first evaluation of the causal effects of a major penal policy in France, the introduction of Electronically Supervised Placement (ESP) as an alternative to short firm prison sentences. Using the progressive implementation of EPS in French courts, the article finds significant beneficial effects of EPS on recidivism, compared to incarceration. Finally, Chapter 4 measures the deterrent effect of a more or less rapid incarceration on future delinquency. This article is the first to estimate the very beneficial effects of using fast-track procedures to prevent recidivism after release.

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In a context where the search for academic excellence is at the heart of the concerns of academic institutions and public authorities, this thesis aims to contribute to the study of the determinants of the scientific production of French professors in economics. By mobilizing original data from teacher-researchers' applications for the "Prime d'Excellence Scientifique", the four proposed contributions seek to articulate two important dimensions, which have rarely been addressed jointly in the literature: the effects of collective externalities in scientific production, and the multitasking nature of teacher-researchers' activity. The first chapter of the thesis analyzes the determinants of the award of the Prime d'Excellence Scientifique (PES) to French professors in economics. We focus on the multitasking character of individual production and the dynamic dimension of this particular form of academic competition implemented since 2009. Econometric results obtained from a sequential model show that scientific publications are the most important determinant of the chances of success in the ESP. We identify discouraging factors during this dynamic tournament. The results also show that past promotion under the previous PEDR scheme increases the promotion chances of teacher-researchers. The second chapter looks at the determining factor in the allocation of the PES and the promotion of teacher-researchers: scientific production. This chapter highlights that the externalities associated with the research environment of teacher-researchers are likely to explain both the individual dynamics of scientific production and the concentration of this production among a small number of teacher-researchers. Our econometric results by quantiles conclude that there are two extreme scientific production regimes: multipurpose and specialist. However, our results do not refute the existence of a scientific production cycle that would be sensitive to the stock of skills accumulated in the work environment of teacher-researchers. Taking into account the potential interactions between teaching and research tasks highlighted in the second chapter, the third chapter proposes to analyze, using a theoretical and econometric model, the effects of the research environment on the choice of activities of teacher-researchers. By controlling for the simultaneity and endogeneity of the choice of teaching and research tasks, the econometric results on our data largely confirm the theoretical predictions: the effects of externalities resulting from the spatial concentration of research and/or training skills at a given time, leads to "typical" profiles of specialists (in research or training) or, on the contrary, "generalists" combining scientific production, pedagogical implications and collective responsibilities. Taking into account the heterogeneity of scientific publications in economics, the fourth chapter analyses the determinants of the "quantity-quality" trade-off in scientific production. In particular, we study the determinants of the choice of two types of publications defined in the CNRS ranking of economics journals: first-ranked publications and second-ranked publications. The econometric results of the joint estimation of these two types of publications conclude that there is a trade-off between good quality publications and publications in less well ranked journals, a trade-off that is sensitive to the externality effects of the research environment of teacher-researchers.

The scientific environment might influence university researchers' job designs. In a principal-agent model, researchers must choose between substitutable tasks, publishing or teaching, according to their individual abilities and the scientific and pedagogical context that exists in their universities. This proposed model shows that scientific production can increase, regardless of researchers' abilities, if the scientific environment favours agglomeration effects. The authors test these predictions using an original data set of French economics professors that reveals their individual investments in both teaching and publishing. The econometric results confirm that the tasks conflict and that the scientific context affects researchers' investments in each task.

No summary available.

No summary available.

The scientific environment might influence university researchers' job designs. In a principal-agent model, researchers must choose between substitutable tasks, publishing or teaching, according to their individual abilities and the scientific and pedagogical context that exists in their universities. This proposed model shows that scientific production can increase, regardless of researchers' abilities, if the scientific environment favours agglomeration effects. The authors test these predictions using an original data set of French economics professors that reveals their individual investments in both teaching and publishing. The econometric results confirm that the tasks conflict and that the scientific context affects researchers' investments in each task.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

The scientific environment might influence university researchers' job designs. In a principal-agent model, researchers must choose between substitutable tasks, publishing or teaching, according to their individual abilities and the scientific and pedagogical context that exists in their universities. This proposed model shows that scientific production can increase, regardless of researchers' abilities, if the scientific environment favours agglomeration effects. The authors test these predictions using an original data set of French economics professors that reveals their individual investments in both teaching and publishing. The econometric results confirm that the tasks conflict and that the scientific context affects researchers' investments in each task.

This thesis proposes three empirical essays devoted to the analysis of strikes in France, based on recent data from establishments and companies and the use of various econometric methods. Very few quantitative studies of economic inspiration have been conducted on this subject in France, in contrast to a particularly extensive Anglo-Saxon literature on the economic analysis of strikes. The decline of unionization and collective action among employees has nevertheless led to a gradual shift in the interest of Anglo-Saxon researchers in labor economics and industrial relations towards the study of individual labor relations between employees and employers. The individualization of jobs and work relations in companies is often considered as orthogonal to the collective action of employees. The decline of strikes and other collective forms of conflict has been associated, in particular, in the Anglo-Saxon literature, with an increase in individual manifestations of conflict and in the dispersion or overall inequality of wages in firms. In this thesis, we propose an original analysis of strikes in France, in relation to these two aspects, which are characteristic of the individualization of jobs and labor relations in companies. The first chapter focuses on the relationship between the collective expression of conflict, including strikes, and the growing individual forms of conflict in French establishments, i.e. recourse to industrial tribunals and disciplinary action. The analysis conducted reveals a substitution relationship between the collective expression of conflict and the recourse to industrial tribunals by employees, while strikes and other collective conflicts tend to be associated with an increased recourse by employers to disciplinary action. The second chapter explicitly considers this relationship, more specifically between strikes and employee absenteeism, in estimating and analyzing the effect of strikes on labor productivity in French firms. The occurrence of strikes in the recent past tends to be associated with a gain in labor productivity in firms with a low frequency of strikes, provided that these strikes are associated with a lower individual expression of employee dissatisfaction (i.e. absenteeism).The third chapter examines the role of intra-firm wage dispersion in variations in strike activity across French establishments. While high wage dispersion within the workforce appears to be a brake on the collective mobilization of employees in strikes, it nevertheless appears to be at the origin of more sustained strike activity, in terms of frequency and duration of strikes, in certain establishments.

By opposing "the passion for present enjoyment" to "the desire to improve our condition", Adam Smith underlined, as early as 1776, the crucial importance of intertemporal preferences in explaining the wealth and economic prosperity of nations. At the microeconomic level, the modeling of intertemporal choices leads to an interest in the psychological interest rate that an economic agent claims when he has to arbitrate between a present and a future consumption unit. The intertemporal trade-off and the effects of impatience are present in two of the main behavioral models in labor economics: human capital theory and job search theory. However, in most of the models derived from these two theories, the inclusion of intertemporal preferences faces two problems. The first problem is that the modeling of intertemporal preferences is limited to the simple introduction of a discount factor. The second problem is that for the econometrician, present preference behaviors belong to the domain of unobservable heterogeneity factors. In this thesis, we address a particular dimension of the role of intertemporal preferences on labor market entry quality. More precisely, we aim to shed light on the impact of intertemporal preferences (impatience) on the unemployment exit rate, on the heterogeneity of outcomes during the transition from unemployment to employment and finally on the decision to take vocational training and its consequences on the wage in the job.

This thesis contains three essays in microeconometrics and applied labor economics. In the first two essays, we estimate dynamic models of schooling choices and employment contract outcomes of the French population. The first essay focuses on the comparison between second-generation immigrants from Africa and their French-natives counterparts. We show that the gap in higher education attainments between those two sub-populations is mainly explained by parents' background and that schooling investment is the main determinant of the gap in permanent employment. The second essay investigates the role played by educational attainments on the employment contract transitions in the early career. We find that a first fixed term contract has a positive impact on the probability of employment in a permanent contract, except for a limited set of the population endowed with particular schooling attainments and unobserved characteristics. Globally, schooling attainments account for around one third of the variance in the probability of permanent employment. The third essay is devoted to the analysis of intra-firm promotions of American executives. We estimate a dynamic model of promotions, in which we disentangle the spurious and the causal impacts of the speed of past advancement. We find that the principal determinant of promotions is unobserved heterogeneity and that the speed of past advancement in the firm's hierarchy (fast tracks) does not have a causal impact on promotions. Functional area has a high explanatory power in promotion outcomes.

The insertion of individuals on temporary work contracts (CTT) into the French labor market is a complex process that this thesis aims to examine. The first part studies the determinants of the use of temporary work contracts. The literature shows that CTTs are solutions to problems related to anti-selection, moral hazard, matching and finally uncertainty affecting the external environment of the firm. The results of the estimations based on the historical employment survey confirm the positive effect of contracting costs mentioned in the literature. The second part of the paper aims to test whether a CTT could be a springboard to an open-ended contract. Using a sample of the Employment survey, the results show that, for both men and women, the probability of transition to an open-ended contract decreases after the 12th month. After a CTT in the public sector, compared to the private sector, temporary workers tend to be unemployed or on another CTT. The third part of the thesis analyzes the impact of individual transitions from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract on wages. We present a model to interpret the transition from a temporary to a permanent job based on a tournament mechanism. The equilibrium properties of the model show that the wage differential between permanent and fixed-term contracts is positively correlated with the uncertainty that accompanies selection into the fixed-term status. Using the Employment survey and using the size of the firm as a proxy for uncertainty, our results confirm that an increase in uncertainty during selection leads to a reinforcement of the wage gap between promoted and non-promoted.

Much of the empirical work on labor markets in developing countries focuses on macroeconomic changes in these markets. However, these macroeconomic changes do not always correctly reflect microeconomic changes at the agent level. This thesis proposes to analyze these microeconomic changes through the analysis of three major behaviors of African workers. It focuses on the migration and labor supply behaviors of individuals. The first behavior studied relates to the migration of rural labor to cities. Our results show that the wage gap between urban and rural areas does not encourage male workers to migrate. However, the urban wage remains an incentive for rural female labor migration. Nevertheless, the analysis of migration in terms of a binary choice can be overcome when the number of migrations made by each individual is available. The number of migrations made by a worker is supposed to account for the worker's turnover in the labor market. Our results indicate that higher wage offers in some regions have induced male and female workers to migrate in large numbers, and thus to change jobs or employers several times. While these analyses of migration behavior partly reflect changes in the labor markets of African countries, analysis of the allocation of available time between paid work and leisure is no less important. It appears that the greater presence of women in the Ivorian labor market has translated into an improvement in the consumption of goods (welfare) or in the bargaining power of women within households. In addition, it is clearly shown that members of the same household do not pool their income.

Why do some individuals choose self-employment? Existing empirical studies highlight the diversity of determinants of self-employment. In line with this work, the originality of our analysis was to study, using French ECHP data, the extent to which self-employed parents transmit to their children trade-specific skills, but also some non-specific managerial skills. Our results show that having self-employed parents significantly increases the probability of being self-employed, whether or not they are in the same occupation as their child. Other more difficult to measure factors such as attitude towards risk and taste for autonomy also seem to influence the choice of self-employment. The methodology used to understand the effect of these factors is experimental economics. The results obtained show that the self-employed are significantly less risk averse and have a greater taste for autonomy. After studying the determinants of self-employment, the second issue of this thesis was to study the quality of insertion into this type of employment. To do this, we studied the differences in income, salary progression and satisfaction between self-employed workers and employees. The results obtained show that if, all other things being equal, the income of the self-employed does not differ significantly from that of employees, they are significantly more satisfied with their type of activity than the latter.

Active policies maintain incentives to seek employment while promoting the acquisition of new skills. In France, conversion agreements help people who have been made redundant to reintegrate into the workforce. The evaluation of the scheme focuses on four dimensions. The econometric analysis shows that the candidates are not the individuals who have the most difficulty in finding a new job (educated, qualified, low spatial constraints). Three criteria of reintegration quality are explored: duration of unemployment, nature of the contract and salary. The econometric models control for selectivity on the unobservables associated with the transition to the agreement. The program has positive effects on these three efficiency indicators, but only for a small proportion of beneficiaries. A majority of non-participants would have had an increased probability of returning to stable employment if they had participated. The program was poorly targeted.

"The existence of non-compensatory wage differences is a stylized fact of labor economics. One explanation can be found in the gift exchange hypothesis initiated by employers. Employers adapt the wage to the standard considered fair by employees, inciting them to maximize their effort in return. The definition of the "fair wage" is firm-specific (Akerlof & Yellen), justifying the persistence of wage differences between firms. However, this interpretation contradicts an elementary behavioral assumption of economic analysis: egoi͏̈sm. Theoretically, shared giving stumbles on a lack of incentive for the employee to produce costly effort. One must then reconsider the scope of the gift exchange hypothesis as a determinant of wage individualization. Experiments show that individuals spend a share of their earnings to punish a selfish partner or reward a benevolent action. Reciprocity produces stable behaviors that must be taken into account in the case of the labor contract. We therefore incorporate these considerations into the agents' utility functions. The goal is to determine their impact on the degree of cooperation. Despite a structure that encourages opportunism, cooperation can occur if the players are reciprocal. We simulate equilibria to reveal the trade-off between the value of gains and incentives for reciprocity. The predictions of the model are tested on individual data from the REPONSE 98 survey. We test the determinants of punishment behavior and present a direct estimate of the gift exchange game. We evaluate the probability of obtaining productivity gains following the introduction of profit sharing in the firm. We highlight the reciprocal nature of the choices to enter conflict, engage in profit-sharing, or increase productivity, corroborating the Arkerlof and Yellen hypotheses."

Because it offers national entrepreneurs a privileged framework for technological and organizational learning, the formation of joint ventures with foreign firms is an important issue for developing countries. The thesis therefore aims to clarify the factors influencing this type of implementation, and more specifically, joint ventures involving local management. The study is applied to the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, two countries that since the early 1980s have liberalized their regimes of openness to foreign capital, allowing, more broadly, the establishment of controlled or fully owned subsidiaries. We argue that when a foreign investment requires the acquisition of complementary assets owned by a local firm, the decision to joint venture depends not only on transaction costs, but also on its impact on the incentive structure of the partners and their attitude towards risk. In particular, this choice is likely if the contribution of the local partner is critical to the success of the project, provided, however, that the local partner is not more risk averse than the foreign firm. The experience of Thailand and the Philippines broadly supports these assumptions. In manufacturing, for example, the degree of local integration of projects (in terms of outlets or supplies) encourages joint ventures and local control of operations. In contrast, this choice is unlikely to be made for projects with a high technological content or that are highly extractive, but also for the riskiest projects because of their size. The results suggest that measures to improve the protection of industrial property, the level of local skills, and the functioning of capital markets or insurance could probably encourage the formation of joint ventures.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the ways in which wages contribute to the performance of Ivorian manufacturing firms. Taking into account the unobservable heterogeneity of employees and firms in the estimation of earnings equations, made possible by the use of matched panel data, makes it possible to obtain measures of returns to human capital variables corrected for different sources of bias and to highlight the role of firm-specific wage policies. The characteristics of firms appear as new segmentation criteria of the Ivorian labor market. The results obtained show, however, that the industrial structure is not the source of non-compensatory wage differentials and that these differentials are more likely to be externalities due to the accumulation of human capital acting at the micro level. By recognizing that information asymmetries are inherent in the employment relationship, a dynamic version of the sociological model of the efficiency wage theory allows for the incentive nature of the employment contract. Wage rigidity can then be explained by the existence of cooperation between employer and employee. The estimates conducted do not invalidate this justification of the efficiency wage theory, but they do show that these non-compensatory wage differences are greater between socio-professional categories than between sectors. The interest then turns to the internal structure of the firm. The analysis extended to a model of interlocking agency relationships makes it possible to determine simultaneously the optimal wages and the hierarchical structure of the firm. By introducing the moral hazard of the principal, we show that the delegation of control is efficient except in the case of blackmail by the supervisor.

The purpose of this thesis is to study the role of search patterns in job search. It is structured in two parts. The first part analyzes the modes as factors in the job search. It highlights, through international surveys, the existence of a plurality of insertion modes. This plurality has rarely been taken into account in the literature, particularly in research models that focus on two exclusive strategies for accessing employment: market research and job research. The econometric analysis of mode choice, based on data from the CEREQ telephone panel (1989-1993), also highlights the existence of an endogenous mode selection rule. The modes are in fact chosen by individuals according not only to their personal attributes but also to the existence of other choice alternatives on the market. The study of search modes thus leads us to conclude that the multiple modes of access to employment constitute so many inputs to the production of information that results from prospecting. In light of this result, the second part of the thesis proposes to evaluate the impact of prospecting modes on the efficiency of the job search. By taking into account the multiplicity of canvassing outputs (duration of access to the job, work contract obtained, job stability, salary. . . .), the econometric results, which are based on the results of the canvassing process, can be used to assess the impact of the canvassing process on the efficiency of job search. ), the econometric results, derived from the exploitation of all the waves of the telephone panel, underline the discriminating impact of the search methods. They show that the most efficient strategy is to combine the social network and market procedures. The analysis of unemployment-job transitions shows that the selection of modes during the search periods depends, in addition to individual attributes, on accumulated work experience. However, no learning effect in the search is revealed. The dynamic analysis also reveals two typical trajectories on the labor market resulting from the existence of a queue in which individuals are selected according to their level of degree and experience.

This thesis confronts the theory of inter-firm relations with the reality of subcontracting relations in the Thai garment sector. The first chapter presents the sectoral (internationalization and vertical desintegration of production processes, international division of labor), historical (Thailand's industrialization process, economic policies) and socio-economic (geographic and sectoral distribution of activities, Thai labor market) contexts of subcontracting. The second chapter studies the actors and forms of the subcontracting relationship in the Thai garment sector, based on original fieldwork. A descriptive analysis of the survey data provides a detailed portrait of the entrepreneurs and firms. An economic exploitation of the individual survey data allows us to deepen certain dominant features of the subcontracting relationship. The third chapter considers subcontracting as a real mode of coordination. The third chapter considers subcontracting as a true mode of coordination. While the theory of subcontracting is similar to the hybrid form, the subcontracting relationships observed in Thailand refute this interpretation. We consider the subcontracting relationship as an incentive structure that can be modeled as a game. Despite the possibility of replaying the game and the eventuality of a cooperative outcome, these approaches show a number of limitations. The fourth chapter focuses on cooperation: subcontracting allows firms to align their production projects and create common resources. However, the geographical, social and cultural proximity of economic actors is essential for the establishment of such relationships. A dynamic perspective allows us to identify the factors explaining the emergence of districts, their evolution and their sustainability.

The aim of the thesis is to analyze the impact of capital market reforms on the financing of Moroccan firms. Three variations of the concept of intermediation efficiency are developed: the productive efficiency judging the performance of banks, the allocative efficiency of credit allocation criteria and finally the informational efficiency of the effects of information asymmetry between banks and firms. 1. The use of the data envelopment method shows that the evolution of the productivity of Moroccan banks is primarily explained by technological progress. The expected effects of financial reforms on bank performance did not occur. Competition was not able to take place, and banks were not encouraged to take advantage of the new environment to improve their technical efficiency. 2. Based on panel data of firms, the analysis confirms the disengagement of the state in the allocation of credit. However, banks do not yet use the economic performance criteria of firms to select their clients. Indeed, they are facing a new environment that assigns them tasks (supervision, selection) for which they have not yet developed skills. 3. Finally, the analysis of information asymmetries in the bank/firm relationship is based on an adjustment cost investment model, derived from a program to maximize the value of the firm (Euler equation). Two financial constraints are introduced: a ceiling on the level of indebtedness and a premium for external finance. The results indicate the existence of this premium and the disengagement of banks from highly leveraged firms. These three insights into the efficiency of bank intermediation show the need to improve access to credit for fragile firms, the circulation of information between agents, and finally, the legal framework.

In 1980, a radical reform of the education system in Chile took place. This reform changed the way primary and secondary education was financed through the creation of a per capita subsidy system, led to the municipalization of primary and secondary schools, and promoted the emergence of private or subsidized private schools. The challenge of the reform can be summarized by the following three imperatives: (I) educational decentralization, (II) school autonomy and (III) professionalization of the teaching force. This reform took place in the course of a regionalization process developed between 1975 and 1991 and which in fact responded to three main objectives: (I) a geopolitical objective of control and harmonious occupation of the territory, (II) a political objective aimed at replacing traditional social and political organizations with a corporatist territorial scheme, and finally (III) an economic objective oriented towards the establishment of the principle of subsidy and the privatization of certain traditional functions of the state. As a result of this reform, a growing number of Chilean analysts are asking whether the possibility of obtaining productive employment and the level of wages are not becoming disconnected from the educational level of individuals measured in years of study, and whether the quality of the institution (public, subsidized private or private) from which individuals come is not becoming a determining factor. Our work is in line with this research, since we will try to see whether since 1980 there has been a structural break in the level of performance of secondary education defined as the number of years of certified study. The theoretical tools used for this study are the traditional analytical tools used in labor economics. The method chosen to capture the consequences of the 1980 reform on the return to human capital is the use of Mincerian earnings equations on data from a pseudo panel provided by the University of Chile. In this way, we establish a differentiated framework depending on whether economic agents completed their secondary education before or after the 1980 reform of the education system. We thus highlight the signaling role of private and subsidized private schools.

Private investment is at the heart of the problem of structural adjustment policies. More than any other intermediate economic policy objective, its recovery is a prerequisite for the transition from stabilization, whose recessionary effects are certain, to growth. However, despite the incentives adopted, the 1980s were accompanied by a decline in private investment in sub-Saharan African countries. Because of macroeconomic instability and the particular economic structures of African countries (imperfect financial markets, a dynamic informal sector, the weight of the state), traditional models of investment have serious difficulties in explaining this reaction of the private sector, as their hypotheses become inappropriate. In addition, the weakness of the statistical apparatus leads to measurement errors on the variables. Taking into account demand uncertainty and using microeconometric analysis provides a better understanding of the microfoundations of investment behavior in Africa. The results obtained from econometric estimates of panel data for the manufacturing sectors in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire corroborate the hypothesis that uncertainty about the future prospects of firms' markets has a significantly negative influence on their investment activity. In Cameroon, local private investors appear less sensitive to uncertainty than foreign investors. In Côte d'Ivoire, firms benefiting from stronger protection appear to be more sensitive to the prospects of a change in outlets. The use of panel data econometrics made it possible to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity in order to obtain greater reliability in the estimates. Finally, the study highlights the role played by the institutional environment of the African entrepreneur.