CHARLOT Olivier

Using annual and quarterly labor market data from the US and France, we study the relationship between the extensive and intensive margins of labor adjustment, job polarization and non-standard work along the business cycle. We derive four stylized facts. First, changes in aggregate hours are mainly driven by fluctuations in per-capita employment rather than hours worked per worker. Second, recessionary drops observed in aggregate hours are, to a large extent, due to the disappearance of routine work. In the US, the fall in routine standard employment accounts for most of the decline in aggregate hours, whereas in France, routine jobs losses in both standard and non-standard work matter. Third, the dynamics of routine standard employment are driven by flows from and into unemployment in both countries. Fourth, the dynamics of routine non-standard work differ across countries. In the US, fluctuations in routine non-standard employment is driven by inflows from routine standard work, while, in France, changes in routine non-standard work are accounted for by ins and outs from unemployment. Our findings support the view that within-employment reallocation, through the use of non-standard work, is an alternative margin of adjustment in the US. This is not the case in France and flexibility is achieved by adjusting hiring and separations of standard and non-standard work. In bad times, reduced stepping stones contribute to the fall in routine standard employment.

No summary available.

The objective of this thesis is to study the contractual dualism existing in the French labor market.I am interested in the flows taking place in the French labor market by highlighting the importance of fixed-term contracts in these flows.French employment protection legislation seems a priori to be clear and concise and firms are subject to strict rules regarding the management of their labor force.However, it would seem that in practice, the constraints on firms in terms of the use of temporary contracts are not so clear and that the vision of the open-ended contract as a "normal" form of employment relationship is not so obvious for firms. Indeed, we observe that their use is very frequent and concerns jobs of increasingly short duration. The objective of this thesis is therefore to better understand the functioning of the French labor market and the impact of contractual dualism. To this end, this thesis is composed of three chapters. The first chapter assesses the magnitude of job and worker flows over the period 1998-2012 by highlighting the impact of the 2008 crisis on these flows as well as the potential strengthening of contractual dualism after this date.I take into account sectoral specificities by isolating the sectors authorized to use so-called contracts of use in order to study the behavior of firms in terms of hiring in these particular sectors.I also detail the evolution of these job and worker flows as a function of firm size. In addition, I study the evolution of the duration of fixed-term contracts over this same period. Finally, I implement an econometric model to shed light on the main determinants of fixed-term contract hiring. In the second chapter, I measure the state-to-state transitions taking place in the French labor market and their impact on the volatility of the unemployment rate. For this purpose, I use a three-state model (employed, unemployed, inactive) as well as a four-state model (permanent contract, fixed-term contract, unemployed, inactive) allowing to take into account the contractual dualism characterizing many European labor markets. This type of four-state model is a real novelty in the sense that it has never been implemented for France. Finally, the third article aims to analyze the consequences of the introduction of a tax on fixed-term contracts in order to encourage firms to hire more permanent employees and to increase the duration of contracts. This measure has recently been introduced in various forms in several European countries. For France, this tax was introduced by the National Interprofessional Agreement signed in 2013.To do so, a matching model is estimated on French data from UNEDIC relying on the model proposed by Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2016).

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.

In developing countries, policies aim to increase employment opportunities in order to raise people's incomes and living standards. Among these countries, the Arab countries of the MENA region have recently experienced a wave of popular uprisings, following increases in poverty, inequality, and exclusion as a result of poor labor market performance. As flow analysis has become the basic tool of modern labor economics, this thesis proposes to explain the functioning of these rather specific labor markets, particularly those of Egypt and Jordan, using job search theory. It focuses on the analysis of job creation and destruction as well as job mobility. She shows that these markets are very rigid. The impact of the introduction of structural reforms, aiming at making employment more flexible, is then discussed both empirically and theoretically. The results show that the reduction of firing costs in Egypt significantly increased job destruction, but had no impact on job creation. This partial failure of the reform is an empirical paradox, which is theoretically interpreted by a crowding out effect due to the increase in the cost of corruption and/or the increase in public sector wages. An original extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides theoretical model is then developed, allowing for the existence of three sectors, public, private formal and private informal. This framework takes into account the particular nature of developing countries. In order to examine the quality of jobs and to study the progress in the wage scale, a structural estimation of the Burdett-Mortensen model is then proposed. It allows us to study and measure the matching frictions in the Egyptian and Jordanian labor markets. The estimated parameters are extremely low, underlining the strong rigidity of these markets. The Jordanian labor market, on the other hand, is found to be more flexible than the Egyptian one. Given the unavailability of annual panel data in these countries, it is shown that retrospective panel data can be used to study short-term transitions in these labor markets. However, these panel data are subject to a memory bias. An original method for correcting the memory bias is therefore proposed and developed. It aims at correcting transitions both at a macro level, using a method of simulated moments, and at a micro level, by constructing weight matrices.

We consider a dual labor market with a frictional formal sector and a competitive informal sector. We show that the size of the informal sector is generally too large compared to the optimal allocation of the workers. It follows that our results give a rationale to informality-reducing policies.

In this paper, we generalize the study of the return to education undertaken in e.g.

No summary available.