MALHERBET Franck

The thesis studies the links between recommendations from the literature on optimal unemployment insurance and the quality of jobs taken up by the unemployed. In particular, we focus on one dimension of job quality, namely job stability, in a context where short and even very short term contracts are expanding rapidly in France. Using theoretical models of job search and matching, we analyze how the characteristics of unemployment insurance affect the stability of the jobs taken up. The particularity of our analysis consists in integrating the way employees are influenced by the parameters of unemployment insurance. Indeed, if we want to analyze in a global way the impact of the parameters of the compensation system on the evolution of the unemployment rate, it is necessary to determine how these parameters influence the rate of exit from unemployment (analysis of the behavior of job seekers) but also how they affect the rate of entry into unemployment (analysis of the behavior of employees). To study the behavior of employees we consider that employees influence their probability of keeping their job by providing job retention efforts. In particular, we show that unemployed workers who leave unemployment quickly frequently return to low-stability jobs. Once employed, they make relatively few efforts to keep their job, thereby increasing their probability of returning to unemployment quickly. The final impact of a reduction in the amount of compensation on the evolution of unemployment is therefore indeterminate when employees are included in the analysis.

This thesis is composed of three articles, each of which asks a question about discrimination. The first article examines whether the inhabitants of Seine-Saint-Denis are statistically discriminated against on the basis of supposed violence . where the practice of a combat sport would be a signal of violence. The second article looks at whether Marseilles accents are discriminated against in the labor market. The last article asks whether employers could use the surname and address of job applicants to correlate their accent and, if they infer that they have an accent from the big cities, to discriminate against them on this point. The "testing" method is used to answer these three questions. The first two testings lead to a negative answer to the first two questions. Regarding the third question, even if it cannot be answered, the third test proves that the accent of the large ensembles is discriminated. Moreover, it shows that discrimination on the patronymic can overshadow that on the address. In general, this work shows that employers do not take sport into account in their hiring practices and that when designing a test, one must distinguish between strong and weak signals. He also shows that testing can be used up to the point where employers contact candidates by phone and engage different stereotypes depending on the accent they hear. Finally, he suggests that policymakers should seek to reduce discrimination based on surname first if they want to reduce total discrimination.

The objective of this thesis is to study the contractual dualism existing in the French labor market.I am interested in the flows taking place in the French labor market by highlighting the importance of fixed-term contracts in these flows.French employment protection legislation seems a priori to be clear and concise and firms are subject to strict rules regarding the management of their labor force.However, it would seem that in practice, the constraints on firms in terms of the use of temporary contracts are not so clear and that the vision of the open-ended contract as a "normal" form of employment relationship is not so obvious for firms. Indeed, we observe that their use is very frequent and concerns jobs of increasingly short duration. The objective of this thesis is therefore to better understand the functioning of the French labor market and the impact of contractual dualism. To this end, this thesis is composed of three chapters. The first chapter assesses the magnitude of job and worker flows over the period 1998-2012 by highlighting the impact of the 2008 crisis on these flows as well as the potential strengthening of contractual dualism after this date.I take into account sectoral specificities by isolating the sectors authorized to use so-called contracts of use in order to study the behavior of firms in terms of hiring in these particular sectors.I also detail the evolution of these job and worker flows as a function of firm size. In addition, I study the evolution of the duration of fixed-term contracts over this same period. Finally, I implement an econometric model to shed light on the main determinants of fixed-term contract hiring. In the second chapter, I measure the state-to-state transitions taking place in the French labor market and their impact on the volatility of the unemployment rate. For this purpose, I use a three-state model (employed, unemployed, inactive) as well as a four-state model (permanent contract, fixed-term contract, unemployed, inactive) allowing to take into account the contractual dualism characterizing many European labor markets. This type of four-state model is a real novelty in the sense that it has never been implemented for France. Finally, the third article aims to analyze the consequences of the introduction of a tax on fixed-term contracts in order to encourage firms to hire more permanent employees and to increase the duration of contracts. This measure has recently been introduced in various forms in several European countries. For France, this tax was introduced by the National Interprofessional Agreement signed in 2013.To do so, a matching model is estimated on French data from UNEDIC relying on the model proposed by Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2016).

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The back cover states: "Faced with endemic unemployment for over thirty years, many countries have chosen to reform their labor markets. These reforms have led to the use of atypical forms of employment, mainly fixed-term contracts and temporary jobs. In France, the result is a dual labor market where highly protected stable jobs coexist with precarious jobs of increasingly shorter duration, often offering employees no other prospect than a return to unemployment. Initially thought of as a remedy for the employment crisis, this flexibilization of part of the market has gradually become a destabilizing force with deleterious social and economic consequences. François Fontaine and Franck Malherbet analyze how this contractual dualism has developed and how it affects the functioning of the French labor market. They propose various structural reforms to remedy it".

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Faced with endemic unemployment for over thirty years, many countries have chosen to reform their labor markets. These reforms have led to the use of atypical forms of employment, mainly fixed-term contracts and temporary work. . In France, the result is a dual labor market where highly protected stable jobs coexist with precarious jobs of ever shorter duration, often offering employees no other prospect than a return to unemployment. Initially thought of as a remedy for the employment crisis, this flexibilization of part of the market has gradually become a destabilizing force with deleterious social and economic consequences. . François Fontaine and Franck Malherbet analyze how this contractual dualism has developed and how it affects the functioning of the French labor market. They propose various structural reforms to remedy it.

In this thesis, I analyze the role of institutions in two areas of study: the labor market and the housing market. In Chapter 1 (with Elisa Guglielminetti), I present a randomized search model to explain the selection of new hires between short and long term contracts. Mining an Italian database, we find that the probability of obtaining a permanent contract increases with a stronger match between the worker's education and occupation. In Chapter 2, I explore the effect of liberalizing fixed-term contracts and find a negative effect on new permanent jobs. The results validate the simulations of the first chapter and confirm the role of match quality in firms' hiring choices. Chapter 3 (with Robert Gary-Bobo), studies the distribution of housing and real estate wealth between generations and, by finding an imbalance in favor of the oldest, identifies taxation instruments to correct it.

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.

The public employment service has undergone profound reforms since 2008. Despite their scope, the recent period has shown the need to continue to reflect on how to deepen them. We propose here, in the light of past experiences, both French and foreign, and of evaluation studies, some avenues for reflection. We address the question of the financing of unemployment insurance and the issue of support for job seekers. We show both the need to strengthen and rethink the methods of support.

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For thirty years, unemployment has never fallen below 8% on a sustained basis. This is undoubtedly a sign that our employment policies need to be reformed. Support measures are essential to reduce unemployment. Yet France is lagging behind. Its policies are tied up in an administrative millefeuille in which the State, the regions, the departments and the municipalities intervene, mobilizing both private and public actors, according to a range of poorly coordinated measures that are still too rarely evaluated. However, the virtues and limitations of these systems are now well understood. There is a vast scientific literature on the subject. It allows us to draw the outlines of policies that work and to identify the audiences for whom it is desirable to mobilize them. It is these results that this book wishes to present.

We consider a dual labor market with a frictional formal sector and a competitive informal sector. We show that the size of the informal sector is generally too large compared to the optimal allocation of the workers. It follows that our results give a rationale to informality-reducing policies.

In this paper, we generalize the study of the return to education undertaken in e.g.

This comparative analysis of employment policies reveals that the best-performing countries emphasize support for jobseekers, beyond compensation. (publisher's summary).

In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. First, we show that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in the context of search-matching economies, they are quantitatively weaker than expected compared to the results established in the earlier literature. In addition, and excluding a model with on-the-job search, it appears that the policy implications of labor taxes and employment protection are not very sensitive to the choice of the bargaining solution.

The modulation of employer contributions to unemployment insurance or experience-rating is an original feature of the American unemployment benefit system. Recommended by the OECD, and proposed on several occasions as an additional tool to fight unemployment, this system remains absent in most OECD countries where unemployment benefits are financed by payroll taxes and government contributions. The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the effects of the introduction of a system of modulation of employer contributions to unemployment insurance, adapted from the American experience-rating system, on a European type of labor market and in the light of the institutional and legislative specificities inherent to these markets. The scope of the study is restricted to the specific dimension of experience-rating relating to employment protection. This research is carried out within a unified theoretical framework, that of equilibrium models of the labor market, and is composed of six chapters. The results of our analyses suggest that modulation of employer contributions is likely to increase labor market performance in continental Europe.