OBIDZINSKI Marie

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This thesis focuses on the monetary incentives to work and to R&D in the French socio-fiscal system, their evolution and their effects. We first simulate the incentives to work more (intensive margin) and to return to work (extensive margin) for the entire French population, taking into account all taxes on labor income and means-tested benefits. We show that incentives have increased at the bottom of the distribution since 1998 as a result of reforms in the 2000s, and that marginal tax rates have shifted from a U-shape according to income levels to a tilde shape. Then, we assess individuals' behavioral responses to these work incentives from social and tax reforms between 2006 and 2015. We show that the effects of marginal rates on labor income are relatively small overall but highly heterogeneous across individual characteristics. The responses would be stronger for income tax reforms than for reforms on social benefits. Finally, we study subsidies and tax incentives for R&D (research tax credit and lower contributions for young innovative firms). We show that R&D subsidy rates increased the most in the 2000s for small firms. For these firms, we evaluate the effect of the strong increase in R&D subsidies on employment devoted to R&D activities. This effect would have been positive and increasing between 2004 and 2010, but less than the increase in aid received between 2008 and 2010.

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In this paper, we analyze how political competition affects the design of public law enforcement policies. The article arrives at two main conclusions (assuming that the cost of enforcement is linear, criminal's type is uniformly distributed, and the society is wealthy enough): 1) electoral competition entails no loss of efficiency at equilibrium for both minor and major offenses (e.g. minor offenses are not enforced, while major ones are fully deterred). 2) distortions arises at equilibrium only in the range of intermediate offenses: enforcement expenditure for small offenses is lower than at optimal level, such that the issue of under-deterrence is exacerbated. in contrast, for more serious offenses, enforcement measures are higher, and there is more (possibly, over) deterrence as compared to what efficiency requires. We show that these results also generalize under more general assumptions, except that full deterrence of major offenses is no longer achievable (a less wealthy society), or enforcement expenditure is bounded above (under convex enforcement costs).

The paper inquires into the impact of mistakes of identity (ID errors) on the optimal standard of proof. A mistake of identity is defined as an error such that an individual is punished for someone else’s crime. and for the same crime, the criminal is falsely acquitted. Therefore, the decision to engage in a criminal activity generates a negative externality, as the expected number of ID errors increases. Thus, our objective is to understand how public law enforcement can deal with this type of error by means of the standard of proof. Our main results are twofold. First, we show that when ID errors occur, the under-deterrence issue is exacerbated. Second, we find that the optimal standard of proof may be higher or lower than without ID errors, depending on the crime rate at equilibrium and on the impact of the standard of proof on (i) the probability of an acquittal error for each crime committed, (ii) the probability of convicting an innocent person when an acquittal error arises, and (iii) the level of deterrence.

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The recent reforms of the "judicial map" in Europe have drastically reduced the number of courts, raising fears of a decline in access to justice. This paper addresses this issue through a litigation model within a Salop (1979) model. We assume that victims of accidents differ both in terms of compensatory damages expected and in terms of distance from court. Due to distance costs, it might be too expensive to file cases for some victims with low expected awards. Therefore, the demand for trials is reduced by a decrease in the number of courts when the probability of an accident is exogenous. However, the link between the number of courts and the demand for trials is not clear cut when the probability of an accident occurring is determined by the defendant through his level of care. Furthermore, we determine the optimal number of courts.

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A flexible law is a law that leaves a margin of discretion to the judge. It is characterized by general or "incomplete" rules. This margin of discretion has a cost: the reduction of the information given by the law to agents. In a context where the complexity of the law is increasing exponentially, the question of the rationality of a flexible law arises. In other words, should legal rules be incomplete or should they specify all contingencies? This thesis fits into the literature of economic analysis of rule characteristics by analyzing the problem from the perspective of law production. First, a theoretical treatment of rule formulation using real options theory is presented in order to contribute to the understanding of the existence of incomplete rules in complex and innovative environments. The question of the basis for public authority intervention is then raised. The choice between a flexible regime, based on the occurrence of harm, and a rigid regime, based on the detection of the activity, depends on the information of the legislator and the agents on the risk. The influence of the degree of precision of the rules on the amicable resolution of disputes is analyzed. This study allows us to justify in part the production of soft law by private parties. Finally, the notion of flexibility is applied to the controversy about the effectiveness of legal harmonization as a solution to jurisdictional competition. The problem of asylum law is considered. Incompleteness of legal rules is thus justified when circumstances vary greatly and when the field is innovative. Otherwise, the precision of the rules informs the agents: it is thus necessary in a context of under or over estimation of the agents' risk and as an aid to the resolution of disputes.