CHATON Corinne

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In October 2015 the European Parliament has established a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) in the Phase 4 of the EU-ETS, as part of the 2030 framework for climate policies. In this paper we model the EU-ETS in presence of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) as it is defined by that decision and investigate the impact that such a measure has in terms of permits price, output production and banking strategies. To do so we build an inter-temporal model in which polluting firms competing in an homogeneous good market are price takers in a permits market and face an uncertain demand. Our main finding is that the MSR succeeds in increasing the permits' price correcting an excess supply (and conversely decreasing it in case of excess demand). However, when the output demand is stochastic, the MSR may alter the arbitrage conditions that determine permits' prices. In some cases which depend on the extend of the demand variation, unintended effects on the price pattern appear. This in turns may adversely affect welfare.

In this article we focus on the so-called back-loading policy adopted by the European Commission to increase the carbon market price. This environmental measure consists of removing a share of the allowances allocated for a given period in order to reallocate some or all of them later on. To analyze the impact of the permits back-loading, we determine the CO2 price equilibrium with and without the policy measure, considering not only the market for permits but also the output market of regulated sectors. We propose a two-period model, where the market for permits is perfectly competitive, and the output market can be either competitive or oligopolistic. First, we define the condition under which banking from one period to another is optimal. This condition, that is the absence of arbitrage opportunities (AOA), depends not only from the period initial allocation but also on production market fundamentals. When this condition is satisfied, the market for emission is shown intertemporally efficient. Second, we point out that the back-loading measure may create inefficiencies or leave unaffected the permits price, if it alters the AOA.

In this article we focus on carbon price dynamics, more speci…cally the impact of a policy envisaged by the European Commission to increase the CO2 price. This policy consists of removing a share of the allowances allocated for a period in order to reallocate some or all of them during the following period. To analyze the impact of this backloading we determine the CO2 market equilibrium with and without the policy, considering not only the market for permits but also the output market of regulated sectors. We propose a two-period model without uncertainty, where the market for permits is perfectly competitive, and the output market can be either com- petitive or oligopolistic. First, we de…ne the condition for which banking from one period to another is optimal. This condition, that is the absence of arbitrage opportunities (AOA), depends on not only from the per period initial allocation but also on production market fundamentals. When this condition is satisfi…ed, the market for emission is shown intertemporally efficient. Second, we show that the “back-loading”policy may be such that theAOA is no longer veri…ed and thus create inefficiencies or being ineffective.

Real assets are usually valued by computing the stream of profits they can bring to a price-taking firm in a liquid market. This method ignores market fundamentals by assuming that all the relevant information is included in the spot price. Our article analyses the bias resulting from such an approach when the market is imperfectly competitive. We propose a stylised two-period model of the natural gas market with no uncertainty, focusing on strategic interactions between two types of oligopolistic players—pure traders and suppliers with downstream customers—who have access to storage. We show that the true value of storage capacity is not the same for traders and for suppliers. Comparing the latter value with the traditional price-taking valuation reveals a systematic bias that tends to induce underinvestment.

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How can uncertainties be taken into account in an investment choice model for power plants? This is the question that we have partly studied in order to determine the impact of uncertainties on investment strategies in the electricity sector. The theoretical framework that we have chosen corresponds to a representation of the problems of investment choice for an electricity producer in a monopoly situation, confronted with two types of uncertainty concerning the level of demand on the one hand and the level of fuels on the other. In the first part, some basic concepts specific to the electricity sector, as well as various choice criteria in an uncertain environment are listed. The second part proposes a two period model. In this model, investment decisions are made during the first period in the presence of uncertainty on fuel prices or demand, which is specified using a load monotone. At the beginning of the second period, the uncertainties are removed, and the minimization of the electricity production costs amounts to determining the contribution of each available technology. The third and more theoretical part extends the field of application of the theory of irreversible investments under uncertainty. The concern of this theoretical extension is to adopt a more realistic representation of the investment choice problems for an electricity producer.