GAUTIER Erwan

This thesis investigates the link between collective bargaining structure and macroeconomic performance. Chapters 1 and 2 study collective bargaining systems by considering their interactions with their institutional environment. Chapter 1 analyzes the role of collective bargaining systems on the link between wage growth and the unemployment rate, i.e., the wage Phillips curve, which may have implications for the feasibility of monetary policy objectives. Chapter 2 explores theoretically how the collective bargaining system influences the outcomes of reforms in employment protection legislation. Chapters 3 and 4 study the macroeconomic effect of collective bargaining system reforms. Chapter 3 provides information on the link between collective bargaining decentralization and economic growth. Finally, chapter 4 questions the timing of reforms that aim to change the institution of collective bargaining, analyzing their effects on employment according to the position in the business cycle when they are implemented.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

This paper examines empirically the dynamics of wage floors defined in industry-level wage agreements in France. It also investigates how industry-level wage floor adjustment interacts with changes in the national minimum wage (NMW hereafter). For this, we have collected a unique dataset of approximately 3200 industry-level wage agreements containing about 70,000 occupation-specific wage floors in 367 industries over the period 2006Q1-2017Q4. Our main results are the following. Wage floors are quite rigid, adjusting only once a year on average. They mostly adjust in the first quarter of the year and the NMW shapes the timing of industry-level wage bargaining. Inflation but also changes in past aggregate wage increases and in the real NMW are the main drivers of wage floor adjustments. Elasticities of wage floors with respect to these macro variables are 0.6, 0.4 and 0.3 respectively. Inflation and the NMW have both decreasing but positive effects all along the wage floor distribution.

This thesis is an empirical work on price dispersion, i.e. the fact that an identical good can be sold at different prices, in violation of the famous law of one price. The approach is part of a literature initiated by Stigler (1961), who notes that "price dispersion is (.) the measure of ignorance in the market". The first chapter studies the impact of the creation of a low-cost retailer on the French fuel distribution market. The first chapter studies the impact of the creation of a low-price brand on the French fuel distribution market. This creation implies that many stations are confronted with a significant price cut by a close competitor. The aggregate reaction measured at the national level is small, but masks increases and decreases in equivalent proportions. The heterogeneity of the reactions highlights the important segmentation of the market. The second chapter, using the same dataset, examines the relevance of models that identify price dispersion at mixed strategy equilibria. Empirically, we observe that the order of prices of competing stations does indeed tend to vary over time, and that its volatility increases as the distance between outlets increases. Dispersion therefore increases with a search cost borne by consumers. In addition, the brand name of the stations largely determines their pricing strategy. Stations with the lowest prices are relatively more likely to maintain prices perfectly aligned with those of nearby competitors, while the dispersion measured between more expensive stations is positively correlated with the cost of diesel and the number of stations in the market. Thus, the results reinforce the view that a market close to Bertrand-style competition coexists with a less competitive market, where stations take advantage of significant frictions.The final chapter focuses on retail, drawing on data collected from an online price comparison service. I observe that the comparisons made between chain stores by the site are relatively uninformative given the heterogeneity of the results at the local level. Moreover, the sample of products selected can lead to widely different results. The volatility of comparisons increases with the distance between supermarkets, which, as in the case of fuel, indicates the presence of search costs. At the local level, the price level does not increase with concentration as proxied by market shares, which calls into question the relevance of this indicator for public policy. Dispersion is positively correlated with the price level, suggesting that imperfect information does indeed allow supermarkets to charge higher prices than in perfect competition.

No summary available.

Using millions of individual price records between 2007 and 2009, this study describes several stylized facts about fuel price adjustment in France: fuel prices change on average once a week . they change more often on Tuesdays and Fridays . competition increases the frequency of price changes . the distribution of price change sizes shows few changes below 2% . price change size and price duration are correlated . fuel price inflation is mostly determined by the relative share of service stations raising or lowering their prices. Adjustment cost models that include informational rigidities best reproduce these stylized facts.

This paper examines empirically how industry-level wage floors are set in French industry-level wage agreements and how the national minimum wage (NMW) interacts with industry-level wage bargaining. For this, we use a unique dataset containing about 48,000 occupation-specific wage floors, in more than 340 French industries over the period 2006-2014. We find that the NMW has a significant impact on the seasonality and on the timing of the wage bargaining process. Inflation, past sectoral wage increases and real NMW increases are the main drivers of wage floor adjustments. elasticities of wage floors with respect to these macro variables are 0.6, 0.3 and 0.25 respectively. Wage floor elasticities to inflation and to the NMW both decrease along the wage floor distribution but are still positive for all levels of wage floors.

In light of the Eurozone Crisis, some countries have implemented reforms to collective wage bargaining institutions, which can be responsible for wage rigidities that are problematic in the face of rising unemployment. This column describes collective wage bargaining in France and how national minimum wage increases are transmitted to wage floors set by industry-level agreements. An increase in the national minimum wage leads to an increase in negotiated industry-level wage floors, which firms then use as references for their wage policy. This might partly explain why French base wages have continued to increase despite recent rising unemployment.

This paper examines empirically how industry-level wage floors are set in French industry-level wage agreements and how the national minimum wage (NMW) interacts with industry-level wage bargaining. For this, we use a unique dataset containing about 48,000 occupation-specific wage floors, in more than 340 French industries over the period 2006-2014. We find that the NMW has a significant impact on the seasonality and on the timing of the wage bargaining process. Inflation, past sectoral wage increases and real NMW increases are the main drivers of wage floor adjustments. elasticities of wage floors with respect to these macro variables are 0.6, 0.3 and 0.25 respectively. Wage floor elasticities to inflation and to the NMW both decrease along the wage floor distribution but are still positive for all levels of wage floors.

We estimate the impact of international trade on wages using data for French manufacturing firms. We instrument firm-level trade flows with firm-specific instrumental variables based on world demand and supply shocks. Both export and offshoring shocks have a positive effect on wages. Exports increase wages for all occupational categories while offshoring has heterogeneous effects. The impact of trade on wages varies across bargaining regimes. In firms with collective bargaining, the elasticity of wages with respect to exports and offshoring is higher than in firms with no collective bargaining. Wage gains associated with collective bargaining are similar across worker categories.

No summary available.

Using micro price data, we document new facts on price rigidity in France: (i) each month 20.1% of prices are changed, which compares with 24.1% in the United States. Excluding sales, however, the fraction of prices modified each month is about the same in France and in the United States (around 17%). (ii) the distribution of price changes is quite dispersed. (iii) the frequencies of price increases and decreases contribute a lot to inflation variations, and price increases are more frequent in January even when sales are excluded. (iv) sales contribute significantly to the volatility of inflation but are much less sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations than regular price changes. (v) during the Great Recession patterns of price adjustment were only slightly modified.

We estimate the impact of international trade on wages using detailed data for French manufacturing firms. We instrument firm-level trade flows with firm-specific instrumental variables based on world demand and supply shocks. Both export and offshoring shocks have a positive effect on wages. Exports increase wages similarly for all occupational categories while offshoring has heterogeneous effects. The impact of trade shocks on wages is heterogeneous across bargaining regimes. In firms with collective bargaining, the elasticity of wages with respect to both exports and offshoring is higher than in firms with no collective bargaining. The wage gains associated with collective bargaining are similar across worker categories.

Using micro price data, we document new facts on price rigidity in France: (i) each month 20.1% of prices are changed, which compares with 24.1% in the United States. Excluding sales, however, the fraction of prices modified each month is about the same in France and in the United States (around 17%). (ii) the distribution of price changes is quite dispersed. (iii) the frequencies of price increases and decreases contribute a lot to inflation variations, and price increases are more frequent in January even when sales are excluded. (iv) sales contribute significantly to the volatility of inflation but are much less sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations than regular price changes. (v) during the Great Recession patterns of price adjustment were only slightly modified.

Using several unique data sets on wage agreements at both industry and firm levels in France, we document stylized facts on wage stickiness and the impact of wage-setting institutions on wage rigidity. First, the average duration of wages is a little less than one year and around 10 percent of wages are modified each month by a wage agreement. Data patterns are consistent with predictions of a mixture of Calvo and Taylor models. The frequency of wage change agreements is rather staggered over the year but the frequency of effective wage changes is seasonal. The national minimum wage has a significant impact on the probability of a wage agreement and on the seasonality of wage changes. Negotiated wage increases are correlated with inflation, the national minimum wage increases and the firm profitability.

This thesis proposes new results on nominal rigidities in France. Chapter 1 provides a synthesis of the work comparing microeconomic models of price rigidity with microeconomic results. Chapter 2 characterizes, with the help of simple statistics, the rigidity of producer prices in France using the individual price surveys used to construct the producer price index. Chapter 3 examines the impact of the minimum wage on restaurant prices by estimating a tobit model on individual consumer price data. The minimum wage has a positive and significant impact on both the decision and magnitude of price changes. Nominal rigidities explain the slow adjustment of prices. Chapter 4 shows the crucial role of bargaining on price rigidity. Ial of bargaining on wage rigidity using an endogenous regimes model estimated on individual wage bargaining data in France.