DARGNIES Marie Pierre

We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants regarding their relative performance by employing hard and easy real-effort tasks. We give participants the option to accept early offers when information about their performance has not been revealed, or to wait for the assortative matching based on their actual relative performance. Early offers are accepted more often when the task is hard than when it is easy. We show that the treatment effect works through a shift in beliefs,i.e., underconfident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral determinant of unraveling, namely biased self-assessments, which can lead to penalties for underconfident individuals as well as efficiency losses.

We have grouped Robert Shiller's work into four sections. The first section will deal with his early work on the questioning of market efficiency and the predictability of rates of return. The second section will focus on Shiller's contributions to behavioral finance and the identification of speculative bubbles. In a third section, we will develop his contributions to real estate finance. Finally, a smaller section will deal with the societal vision of finance that Shiller develops in Finance and the Good Society.

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In Western societies, it is generally known that men have a greater taste for competition than women. However, the determinants of the decision to enter competitions are still not fully understood. The aim of this paper is twofold. We first evaluate how participants update their beliefs after receiving feedback informing them of whether their performance is below or above the median performance. Second, we are interested in how men and women react to this information in terms of competitive entry. Our first result is that participants, and women in particular, react more strongly to the feedback they receive than would a Bayesian agent. As far as entry into competition is concerned, below-median participants adjust their entry decision according to the competition they expect to face, while above-median participants do not. However, the behaviour behind these results is quite different for men and women: women mainly react to information on their own performance, while men seem to respond more to their beliefs over the competition they will face. Moreover, most of the effect of feedback and the information regarding the level of the competition on the decision to compete seems to operate via beliefs.

In Western societies, it is generally known that men have a greater taste for competition than women. However, the determinants of the decision to enter competitions are still not fully understood. The aim of this paper is twofold. We first evaluate how participants update their beliefs after receiving feedback informing them of whether their performance is below or above the median performance. Second, we are interested in how men and women react to this information in terms of competitive entry. Our first result is that participants, and women in particular, react more strongly to the feedback they receive than would a Bayesian agent. As far as entry into competition is concerned, below-median participants adjust their entry decision according to the competition they expect to face, while above-median participants do not. However, the behaviour behind these results is quite different for men and women: women mainly react to information on their own performance, while men seem to respond more to their beliefs over the competition they will face. Moreover, most of the effect of feedback and the information regarding the level of the competition on the decision to compete seems to operate via beliefs.

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Recent research shows that men have a stronger taste for competition than women. This paper presents an experimental protocol highlighting the different determinants of the choice to compete: beliefs and the level of competition. We find that low-performing subjects adapt to the level of competition, which is not the case for high-performing subjects. Our experiment also shows that information is not processed in the same way by men and women: women give more weight to the information received, while men take more into account the level of competition they will face. In general, men and women deviate from Bayesian beliefs, and information about their performance makes them overly pessimistic if this information is negative (overly optimistic otherwise).

This thesis is interested in a specific explanation for the gender gap in social positions and wages: gender differences in willingness to enter competitive environments. The experimental approach used here allows to control for several factors which may influence competitive behaviors and are impossible to disentangle by observing the labor market. The first chapter deals with overconfidence and provides several incentives to reduce this cognitive bias. The second chapter studies the effect of team competition on the gender gap in willingness to compete. While women are not more attracted by team competition than they are by individual competition, men shy away from the competition when it is team-based. The main reason for men's disaffection for team competition is that they fear being matched with a less able teammate. The effect of group identity on competitive behaviors is explored in the third chapter. Women's willingness to compete is not clearly affected by group membership but men are more likely to enter the team competition without knowing the performance level of their teammate when he or she is a fellow group member rather than a random participant. Group identity therefore shifts men's behavior towards decisions more in favor of the whole group.

This thesis focuses on a particular explanation for the glass ceiling effect faced by women in the labor market: a gender difference in preference for competition. The experimental approach adopted here allows to control for a number of factors that influence competitive behavior and that are impossible to disentangle by observing the labor market. The first chapter deals with overconfidence and proposes several incentives to reduce this cognitive bias. The second chapter studies the effect of team competition on the male-female difference in liking for competition. While women are no more attracted to team competition than to individual competition, men shun team competition while they used to massively enter individual competition. The main reason for men's disaffection with team competition is their fear of being associated with a less successful teammate. The effect of group identity on competitive behavior is discussed in the third chapter. Women's willingness to compete is not significantly affected by group membership while men become more likely to enter the tournament as a team without knowing the quality of their teammate. They therefore make decisions that benefit their group even if it means increasing the risk of being associated with an underperforming teammate.