LAMBRECHT Stephane

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The objective of this thesis is to study the impact of the introduction of inheritance taxes on growth and labor supply, by considering the diversity of intergenerational family transfers. Indeed, family transmission can be educational, cultural, patrimonial, or even perceived as a transfer of time. All these forms of family solidarity generate externalities, which have a different impact on growth and the supply of labor, which may affect the effectiveness of tax policies. For example, the estate tax reduces the incentive to save but may increase educational investment or time transfers, which may positively affect household productivity and labor supply. Here we develop theoretical models with nested generations and altruism towards descendants. The thesis is composed of three chapters. The first chapter studies the impact of the non-availability of public debt on the intergenerational redistribution policy implemented by the government, using only the tax on labor income and the estate tax. It also allows for an analysis of its effect on economic growth and intergenerational family transfers, consisting of bequests and education expenditures, by highlighting the central role of inheritance taxation. The second chapter proposes a model with bequests and downward time transfers, whose objective is to show the differences between inheritance taxation and life-cycle capital taxation on household behavior. We show that using inheritance taxation instead of capital taxation can be a Pareto-improving reform, depending on the effect of the reform on labor supply. Finally, the third chapter also looks at the comparison between capital taxation and inheritance taxation, in a model where dynasties are different in terms of productivity and level of altruism. This chapter shows that applying the estate tax instead of the capital tax can improve the welfare of the less altruistic in the long run and, in some cases, can be Pareto-improving, if the resources available to the more altruistic increase with the reform.

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Altruism is one of the explanations given by economists to account for intergenerational transfers within the family. Parents are interested in the well-being of their children and play on intergenerational solidarity in their favour. In macroeconomic models with overlapping generations, the instance where altruism develops is the dynasty. This thesis refocuses the study of intergenerational solidarities on the family. In contrast to the anonymous exchanges of markets, private transfers within families are characterized by non-anonymity stemming from the frequency of contacts and the small number of participants in these contacts. The inter-generational economy is made up of a sequence of families that follow one another over time. This conception of intergenerational transfers leads to a formulation of altruism different from Barro's dynastic altruism. Instead of the utility of the descendant, it is the income that he receives during the period of coexistence with his ascendant that enters the latter's utility function. In contrast to Barro's dynastic model, this conception of the family and the specification of altruism that is induced by it form the basis of the family model. There can be a multiplicity of stationary equilibria with altruism operating, including over-accumulation (chapter I). Pensions are neutral (chapter II) but public debt is not insofar as, unlike pensions, it modifies the family income taken into account by the altruistic head of household (chapter III). If one introduces the educational expenses incurred by heads of families in favour of their descendants, under certain conditions, there is an optimal level of pensions that maximizes the long-run growth rate of the economy.