ROJAS BREU Mariana

We construct a search model where sellers post prices and produce goods of unknown quality. A match reveals the quality of the seller. Buyers rate sellers based on quality. We show that unrated sellers charge a low price to attract buyers and that highly rated sellers post a high price and sell with a higher probability than unrated sellers. We fi nd that welfare is higher with a ratings system. Using data on Airbnb rentals, we show that Superhosts and hosts with high ratings: 1) charge higher prices, 2) have a higher occupancy rate and 3) higher revenue than average hosts.

We construct a search model where sellers post prices and produce goods of unknown quality. A match between a buyer and a seller reveals the quality of the seller.We look at the pricing decisions of the sellers in this environment. We then introduce a rating system whereby buyers reveal the seller’s type by giving them a ‘star’ ifthey are a high quality seller. We show that new sellers charge a low price to attractbuyers and if they receive a star they post a high price. Furthermore, high qualitysellers sell with a higher probability than new sellers. We show that welfare is higherwith a ratings system. Using data on Airbnb rentals to compare the pricing decisionsof Superhosts (elite rentals) to non-Superhosts we show that Superhosts: 1) chargehigher prices, 2) have a higher occupancy rate and 3) higher revenue than non-Superhosts.

We construct a search model where sellers post prices and produce goods of unknown quality. A match between a buyer and a seller reveals the quality of the seller. We look at the pricing decisions of the sellers in this environment. We then introduce a rating system whereby buyers reveal the seller's type by giving them a “star” if they are a high quality seller. We show that new sellers charge a low price to attract buyers and if they receive a star they post a high price. Furthermore, high quality sellers sell with a higher probability than new sellers. We show that welfare is higher with a ratings system. Using data on Airbnb rentals to compare the pricing decisions of Superhosts (elite rentals) to non-Superhosts we show that Superhosts: 1) charge higher prices, 2) have a higher occupancy rate and 3) higher revenue than non-Super hosts.

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This paper analyzes a two-country model of currency, banks and endogenous default to study whether impediments to credit market integration across jurisdictions impact the desirability of a currency union. We show that when those impediments induce a higher cost for banks to manage cross-border credit compared to domestic credit, welfare may not be maximal under a regime of currency union. But a banking union that would suppress hurdles to banking integration restores the optimality of that currency arrangement. The empirical and policy implications in terms of banking union are discussed.

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This paper presents a framework in which fiat money has value in equilibrium even though a risk-free higher-return asset can be equally used as a medium of exchange. In a limited-commitment environment, agents may prefer to borrow a low-return asset because that results in a larger borrowing capacity. Thus, a monetary equilibrium in which money is dominated in rate of return exists.

With the Euro Area context in mind, we show that currency arrangements impact on credit available through default incentives. To this end we build a symmetric two-country model with money and imperfect credit market integration. Differences in credit market integration are captured by variations in the cost for banks to grant credit for cross-border purchases. We show that for high enough levels of this cost, currency integration may magnify default incentives, leading to more stringent credit rationing and lower welfare than in a regime of two currencies. The integration of credit markets restores the optimality of the currency union.

This paper analyzes a two-country model of money and banks to examine the conditions under which the creation of a monetary union between two countries is optimal. Is is shown that if agents resort to banks to adjust their monetary holdings through borrowing and if nobody can force them to repay their debts, it may be optimal for both countries to set up two different currencies, along with strictly positive conversion costs. A necessary condition for this is that credit market integration is limited. This arises even though both countries are perfectly identical.

This paper analyzes a two-country model of currency, banks and endogenous default to study whether impediments to credit market integration across jurisdictions impact the desirability of a currency union. We show that when those impediments induce a higher cost for banks to manage cross-border credit compared to domestic credit, welfare may not be maximal under a regime of currency union. But a banking union that would suppress hurdles to banking integration restores the optimality of that currency arrangement. The empirical and policy implications in terms of banking union are discussed.

This thesis focuses on the competition between means of payment. First, we present a prospecting model to recover Tooke's (1844) thesis: money is used in transactions between entrepreneurs and wage earners. credit is used in transactions between entrepreneurs. Subsequently, we present a model in which agents can use credit or money, although the use of credit is subject to fallible technology. Wider access to credit does not necessarily imply welfare improvement as it may make risk sharing less efficient. We perform a quantitative analysis using data from the United States and show that the expansion of credit access in recent years has not led to welfare improvement. Second, we address a seemingly paradoxical finding: national currencies remain the primary medium of exchange in most economies, despite the availability of less inflationary currencies. We show that, if banks have limited debt enforcement power, the inflation of the currency in which debts are denominated can operate as a commitment device for borrowers so that, in equilibrium, agents prefer the more inflationary currency, even in the absence of transactions costs to use the competing currency. Finally, we study the effect of inflation and financial system efficiency on growth and welfare. Our formalization of the monetary exchange of the innovation market allows us to estimate a broader cost of inflation than previous estimates.