FEVRIER Philippe

This thesis addresses several questions related to the economics of education and the economics of teams. In the first chapter, based on a collaboration with Laurent Rossignol, we focus on school guidance. We highlight the existence of orientation biases in the French educational system: the orientation of students does not depend only on their academic performance but also on their gender and social background. Our main contribution is to distinguish the impact of students' aspirations from the impact of teachers' ratings and recommendations on these orientation biases. The second chapter, co-authored with Antoine Chapsal, aims to understand some of the incentives and psychological effects associated with teamwork, using data on squash team championships. We show that players value participating in the success of their team, which partly explains why incentives to exert effort are stronger in collective contexts than in individual contexts. The third chapter, stemming from initial work with Rodrigo Lopez-Kolkovsky, aims to develop an estimation procedure to measure individual team productivity, using data on European soccer. We then confront this measure with the market value of players and show that Black players are discriminated against in the market.

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This thesis is devoted to the theoretical, empirical and experimental study of multi-unit auctions. It is composed of four chapters. The first one, theoretical, analyzes the role of information transmission in sequential auctions. The second and third chapters focus on the call option that allows the winner of an auction, in sequential auctions of homogeneous goods, to acquire the number of goods he wants at the price at which he has just won the auction. The first of these two chapters studies this question theoretically and experimentally thanks to an experiment carried out at the E. N. S. A. E. The second chapter also contains a theoretical part and an empirical analysis, which is based on data from wine sales at Drouot. Finally, the last chapter compares the revenues obtained in discriminatory and uniform auctions of French treasury bills.