PLISSON Manuel

No summary available.

Support for the presentation by N.Zerrar at the Modapa seminar on April 9, 2015. Summary of the article: In a context of aging population, different scenarios are considered to reform the organization and financing of the care of dependent elderly people. The role of individual insurance in the financing of dependency care is widely debated. At present, despite potentially substantial out-of-pocket expenses, few individuals have insurance coverage. This article aims to add to the existing literature by assessing the extent to which the preferences observed in the population limit this coverage. To do so, we mobilize the 2011 Pater survey (Patrimoine et préférences vis-à-vis du temps et du risque). At the request of the Fondation Médéric Alzheimer, the 2011 wave of the Pater survey included a complementary questionnaire on the perception of long-term care risk and insurance behavior (Pated). The Pater survey allows the construction of scores quantifying four dimensions of preferences likely to influence the perception of risk and the probability of purchasing insurance among individuals perceiving the risk: preference for the present, risk aversion, family altruism and presumed taste for informal help. The estimation results show a significant role for each of these dimensions in the demand for insurance. Nevertheless, even in a population with the most favorable preferences for insurance purchase, the simulations show that the rate of equipment would not exceed 20 percent. Increased recourse to individual provision through the generalization of private insurance coverage therefore seems difficult to envisage unless there is a strong evolution in the supply of insurance or public regulation encouraging or forcing the purchase of insurance.

No summary available.

In the context of an aging population, various scenarios are being considered for reforming the organization and financing of care for dependent elderly people. The role of individual insurance in the financing of dependency is widely debated. At present, despite potentially substantial out-of-pocket expenses, few individuals have insurance coverage. This article aims to add to the existing literature by assessing the extent to which the preferences observed in the population limit this coverage. To do so, we mobilize the 2011 Pater survey (Patrimoine et préférences vis-à-vis du temps et du risque). At the request of the Fondation Médéric Alzheimer, the 2011 wave of the Pater survey included a complementary questionnaire on the perception of long-term care risk and insurance behavior (Pated). The Pater survey allows the construction of scores quantifying four dimensions of preferences likely to influence risk perception and the likelihood of purchasing insurance among individuals perceiving the risk: preference for the present, risk aversion, family altruism and the presumed taste for informal help. The estimation results show a significant role for each of these dimensions in the demand for insurance. Nevertheless, even in a population with the most favorable preferences for insurance purchase, the simulations show that the rate of equipment would not exceed 20%. Increased recourse to personal insurance through the generalization of private insurance coverage therefore seems difficult to envisage unless there is a strong evolution in the supply of insurance or public regulation encouraging or forcing the purchase of insurance. JEL codes: C25, D91, G22, I12, I18, J14. Keywords : dependence, loss of autonomy, dependence insurance, insurance demand, present preference, risk aversion.

No summary available.

In the economic literature, many studies attempt to explain why individuals insure themselves so little against LTC. On the supply side, various possible obstacles to the development of the LTC insurance market have already been pointed out in the literature. Recent estimates show, however, that supply-side limitations are not sufficient to explain the slow development of the market: even if insurance were less expensive and the coverage offered more extensive, the majority of individuals would still not take out insurance. It is therefore necessary to look for explanations on the demand side of LTC insurance. This article aims to enrich the existing literature by empirically studying the role of risk perception in the decision to take out LTC insurance, based on direct observation of individual preferences (risk aversion, preference for the present) made possible by the 2012 wave of the "Preferences and Wealth in relation to Time and Risk" (PATER) survey. In addition to the effect of socio-demographic characteristics, the econometric estimates carried out highlight the role of individual preferences in LTC risk coverage behaviour. Preference for the present is thought to play an important role in the perception of LTC risk, while risk aversion explains the fact of insuring against this risk among those who envisage the possibility of one day being in a LTC situation.

LTC insurance for the elderly is an enigma in France and in many other developed countries (United States, Spain, etc.). Why has the LTC insurance market not developed further, when LTC represents a very significant financial risk for the elderly and public assistance is very inadequate in most countries? This thesis proposes an original study of the LTC market and provides a new answer to this enigma. It studies whether the market rationing is explained by reasons related to the functioning of markets (explanations most often retained by the literature) or whether this sub-optimal equilibrium is the result of more institutional reasons. This research leads to four results. In the first part, it shows, on the basis of original data, that it is possible to push back the frontier of insurability for LTC risk, particularly for home care. In the second part, we show that individual preferences may lead some agents not to insure themselves for at least two reasons: either because the product offered is not a fully insured product or because their actual or anticipated health status has a very strong effect on the valuation of their wealth. We also have a portfolio of insured individuals. The results obtained from these data, never before available in France, indicate that the LTC contract is destined to become a mass product, particularly appreciated by the working and middle classes. Finally, in the third part, standard tests conclude from our data that there is no anti-selection in the French LTC insurance market. This absence of anti-selection could be explained by compensation phenomena. From these four results, we can argue that the weak development of the French LTC insurance market is not explained by a market failure in the coverage of this risk but by more contextual and institutional reasons (criteria for the allocation of public aid, disadvantageous taxation compared to insurance contracts, etc. . ). However, a part of the population, because of its preferences, will rationally continue not to insure itself.