LE BARBANCHON Thomas

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of hiring credits. Using comprehensive administrative data, we show that the French hiring credit, implemented during the Great Recession, had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages. Relying on the quasi-experimental variation in labor cost triggered by the hiring credit, we estimate a structural search and matching model. Simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features: it was nonanticipated, temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages. We estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits, either countercyclical or time-invariant, in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher.

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of hiring credits. Using comprehensive administrative data, we show that the French hiring credit, implemented during the Great Recession, had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages. Relying on the quasi-experimental variation in labor cost triggered by the hiring credit, we estimate a structural search and matching model. Simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features: it was nonanticipated, temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages. We estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits, either countercyclical or time-invariant, in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher.

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We propose a novel selectivity correction procedure to deal with survey attrition in treatment effect models, at the crossroads of the Heckit model and the bounding approach of Lee (2009). As a substitute for the instrument needed in sample selectivity correction models, we use information on the number of prior calls made to each individual before obtaining a response to the survey. We obtain sharp bounds to the average treatment effect on the common support of responding individuals. Because the number of prior calls brings information, we can obtain tighter bounds than in other nonparametric methods.

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not. participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.

The main purpose of unemployment insurance is to ensure income replacement for those involuntarily deprived of employment. While the policy meets this aim, there are questions about its effectiveness in other aspects. In theory, generous unemployment benefits slow re-entry into the workforce but are also likely to improve the quality of employment found. This study is an empirical assessment of the impact of the extension of the maximum period of unemployment benefits in France between 2000 and 2002. When the benefits limit was extended from seven to fifteen months, the rate of return to work decreased by 28 per cent (representing an increase in the duration of unemployment by around two and half months), while the stability of work found and wages paid did not noticeably improve.

The primary objective of unemployment insurance is to provide a replacement income to people who are involuntarily unemployed. Beyond this primary role, the question arises as to the effectiveness of this system. In theory, more generous unemployment benefits slow down the exit from unemployment but are also likely to improve the quality of the job found. This study empirically measures the impact of an increase in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits in France between 2000 and 2002. When the duration of unemployment benefits is increased from 7 to 15 months, the rate of return to employment decreases by 28 percent (i.e., an increase in the duration of unemployment of about two and a half months), while the stability of the job found and the wages received are not significantly improved.

In the first two chapters, we estimate the impact of two labor market policies in the French context: * anonymous applications: information, such as name, gender, age, nationality and address, is erased from resumes sent to employers (first chapter). Anonymous applications limit differential treatments based on gender and counter homophily. * Unemployment Insurance generosity: job losers receive benefits to prevent revenue loss and to subsidize job search (second chapter). We show that an increase of 8 months in potential benefit duration does not affect match quality, while it slows down unemployment exits to jobs. We devote special attention to identify causal impacts and thus rely on experimental or quasi experimental evidence to perform our empirical evaluation exercises. Namely, we compare treated and control groups which are ex ante statistically identical. However, we discuss two potential caveats of microeconometric evaluations in the context of Job Search Assistance evaluation, one "practical" in the third chapter and one "theoretical" in the fourth chapter: * ex post comparability of control and treated groups when sample attrition can be different among experimental groups (third chapter). * uncontrolled contamination between control and treated group through market interaction (fourth chapter).

In the first two chapters, we estimate the impact of two labor market policies in the French context: * anonymous applications: information, such as name, gender, age, nationality and address, is erased from resumes sent to employers (first chapter). Anonymous applications limit differential treatments based on gender and counter homophily. * Unemployment Insurance generosity: job losers receive benefits to prevent revenue loss and to subsidize job search (second chapter). We show that an increase of 8 months in potential benefit duration does not affect match quality, while it slows down unemployment exits to jobs. We devote special attention to identify causal impacts and thus rely on experimental or quasi experimental evidence to perform our empirical evaluation exercises. Namely, we compare treated and control groups which are ex ante statistically identical. However, we discuss two potential caveats of microeconometric evaluations in the context of Job Search Assistance evaluation, one "practical" in the third chapter and one "theoretical" in the fourth chapter: * ex post comparability of control and treated groups when sample attrition can be different among experimental groups (third chapter). * uncontrolled contamination between control and treated group through market interaction (fourth chapter).