NAVAUX Julien

We use the National Transfer Accounts methodology to calculate private asset income by age for the years 1979–2011. We analyze age profiles using three indicators of intergenerational equity. Monetary asset income shows no evidence of generational breaks to the benefit of the baby‐boom generation. On the contrary, baby‐boomers suffered from the high interest rates that they paid to become homeowners. Imputed rents show an obvious breakdown of intergenerational equity when we use an inter‐age and intergenerational indicator. This indicator compares the per capita asset income at a given age with the average asset income of people aged 18‐85. It gives the relative situation of one age group compared to its contemporaries and it also gives the relative situation of one generation when we compare birth cohorts over time. We find that the cohort born in 1950 benefited from a better position than their successors. Moreover, the cohorts born before the war and during the war appear to be even more favored than the baby‐boomers. The cohorts born in 1930 and in 1940 have a better situation than the previous generations and a better position than the following generations.

This paper proposes a reassessment of economic growth in France between 1985 and 2010, incorporating domestic production into the wealth indicators of gross domestic product (GDP) and labor income. Over the period, GDP growth is overestimated by 0.35 percentage points. A time decomposition reveals that growth is clearly overestimated during the period 1985-2000, while it is rather underestimated during the period 2000-2010. The slowdown in GDP growth after the 2000s is much less evident when using the indicator extended to domestic production, whose growth rate falls from 1.6 percent to 1.5 percent.

This paper proposes a reassessment of economic growth in France between 1985 and 2010, integrating domestic production with the wealth indicators of Gross Domestic Product and labor income. Over the period, GDP growth is overestimated by 0.35 percentage points. A time decomposition reveals that growth is clearly overestimated during the period 1985-2000, while it is rather underestimated during the period 2000-2010. The slowdown in GDP growth after the 2000s is much less evident when using the indicator extended to domestic production, whose growth rate increases from 1.6% to 1.5%.

A BETTER UNDERSTANDING of the resource allocation across ages is fundamental to put in place welfare reforms in the context of population ageing. In times of major demographic change, the redistribution of resources between age groups and the funding of the economically inactive aged remains a recurring topic of public debate and a major public policy concern in OECD countries. Governments search for a policy mix that will improve the quality of life of the elderly, while at the same time investing in the future of the young and reducing the fiscal burden on the working population. Life expectancy and education requirements are increasing while budget constraints are tightening. This potentially creates tension in the allocation of resources between age groups (Preston 1984. Lee and Mason 2011a). Some authors have shown the negative impact that a growing share of elderly could have on education spending for the young (Poterba 1997, 1998. Harris et al. 2001). The compact between the generations could suffer as a result (United Nations 2013a. Chen et al. 2018).

This article provides a comprehensive overview of how the funding of consumption at different ages is shared between the State, the individual and the family. By applying the National Transfer Accounts method for France, we developed a unique database to analyze how the funding of consumption is secured at each age, how its structure has changed over time, and how the consumption is financed in France compared to that of a set of other developed countries. We find that the elderly in France finance themselves increasingly by their own means, even though public funding of this age group remains significant in France in comparison to other countries. Conversely, the young rely more and more on the State to finance their consumption. Within our sample, France is the country where the young benefited most from public transfers.

No summary available.

We use the National Transfer Accounts methodology to calculate private asset income by age for the years 1979–2011. We analyze age profiles using three indicators of intergenerational equity. Monetary asset income shows no evidence of generational breaks to the benefit of the baby-boom generation. On the contrary, baby-boomers suffered from the high interest rates that they paid to become homeowners. Imputed rents show an obvious breakdown of intergenerational equity when we use an inter-age and intergenerational indicator. This indicator compares the per capita asset income at a given age with the average asset income of people aged 18–85. It gives the relative situation of one age group compared to its contemporaries and it also gives the relative situation of one generation when we compare birth cohorts over time. We find that the cohort born in 1950 benefited from a better position than their successors. Moreover, the cohorts born before the war and during the war appear to be even more favored than the baby-boomers. The cohorts born in 1930 and in 1940 have a better situation than the previous generations and a better position than the following generations.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

No summary available.

The objective of this thesis is to verify whether the baby-boomers are at the origin of a break in intergenerational equity in France. It is based on an application of the National Transfer Accounts method, which provides an age-specific measure of consumption, individual resources, savings and public and private transfers between 1979 and 2011. Projections are also made to the year 2060 using the MELETE model for public transfers received and disposable income. The results, which are established with regard to the main criteria of intergenerational justice, do not show a clear and generalized break in intergenerational equity, even if French society is characterized by certain inequities concerning the distribution of income from assets and the distribution of retirement pensions between generations. Moreover, this thesis provides results that are useful for understanding family solidarity in France. Over the last thirty years, the increase in the economic weight of donations and inheritances has coincided with a decrease in the weight of aid within households and a stability in the weight of aid between households. The result is that private transfers between households are less and less adapted to the needs of the beneficiaries, which is corroborated by a micro-econometric panel analysis that shows that events experienced by donors can trigger the payment of donations, unlike aid between households, which depends exclusively on events experienced by the recipients.

No summary available.

We use the National Transfer Accounts methodology to calculate the lifecycle deficit in France for the years 1979–2005. During this period, consumption profiles were roughly constant over age, while labor income profiles shifted to higher ages. The share of the aggregate lifecycle deficit in GDP rose sharply in the 1980s due to an increase in the mean age of the population. In contrast, the per capita shares of the lifecycle deficit attributed to the population under 20 and over 60 varied little during this period, even though the relative weights of these two age-segments has shifted continuously in favor of the latter.

We use the National Transfer Accounts methodology to calculate the lifecycle deficit in France for the years 1979-2005. During this period, consumption profiles were roughly constant over age, while labor income profiles shifted to higher ages. The share of the aggregate lifecycle deficit in GDP rose sharply in the 1980s due to an increase in the mean age of the population. In contrast, the per capita shares of the lifecycle deficit attributed to the population under 20 and over 60 varied little during this period, even though the relative weights of these two age-segments has shifted continuously in favor of the latter.