KERVINIO Yann

The ecological emergency calls for a marked reorientation of public and private investments from unfavorable activities to more environmentally friendly ones. Green finance can contribute to this, provided that it is equipped with tools that can properly integrate environmental impacts into the evaluation of investments. In this article, we discuss how the socio-economic calculation, currently used for the evaluation of investment projects by the State and its operators, can be a useful tool for private actors wishing to integrate the environmental impacts of their investments to a degree consistent with the collective ambition in this area. We highlight the importance of having specific and measurable environmental objectives, which legitimize and translate into operational terms our collective ambition in the face of current ecological challenges.

Urban green spaces provide cultural ecosystem services, and urban policies typically aim to enhance these services by targeting new investments in deprived areas. The implementation of urban greening policies is one way to reduce inequalities in well-being, for example by targeting areas where increased access to green spaces will benefit citizens of low socioeconomic status. Most research has addressed the targeting of green infrastructure development by considering income and access to green spaces, while few studies have considered a multidimensional definition of well-being. The aims of this paper are to i) integrate inputs from the economic and political philosophy literature to propose a broader definition of well-being, including health, education, insecurity, and social relations. ii) develop a criterion to prioritise areas where urban greening would have the greatest impact on well-being inequalities. and iii) apply this criterion to the Paris metropolitan area (Ile-de-France region), a spatially heterogeneous region where areas deprived of access to green spaces are not systematically deprived in other dimensions. Our analysis shows that the city of Paris and the inner suburbs would be targeted when considering inequality in access to green spaces only. The results differ when inequalities in income or multidimensional well-being are taken into account, in which case the northern inner suburbs and some outer suburbs become a higher priority.

Assessing the fairness of a public policy is not self-evident, as the criteria associated with the idea of fairness are diverse, imprecise and potentially contradictory. In this thesis, a two-stage approach is developed and discussed, which aims to identify equitable public policy options that are likely to be the subject of consensus after deliberation among those concerned. First, it is proposed to clarify the principles invoked and their articulation in a formalized decision-making context. Such an approach emphasizes the necessary trade-offs between these principles and makes it possible to identify possibilities for reconciling them, sometimes in a new way. Next, it is proposed to evaluate the fairness of the options identified on the basis of the judgments and values of the people concerned, as they can be observed through survey work or laboratory experiments. This approach is then implemented in a particular decision-making context where equity is a strong expectation: the location of socially desirable but locally undesirable public facilities. In the fourth chapter, I study the properties of different decision rules in a simple setting where a single indivisible project must be allocated among several agents with varying costs and compensation requirements. In the fifth chapter, I present the results of a laboratory experiment that focuses on the judgments of subjects placed in a situation similar to the one studied in the previous chapter. Finally, a last chapter is devoted to the study of some implications of a generalization of the initial framework to a set of situations that allows for the existence of externalities.

We consider the decentralized provision of a global public good with local externalities in a spatially explicit model. Communities decide on the location of a facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through transfers. We examine cooperative games associated with this so-called Not In My Back-Yard problem. We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven by the temptation to exclude groups of neighbors at any potential location. We illustrate the results in different spatial settings. These results clarify how property rights can affect cooperation and shed further light on a limitation of the Coase theorem.